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ABSTRACT
This thesis determines whether the European Union is becoming a great power To do so it addresses two 
questions 1) Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy and 2) is the EU developing the military 
capability required of a great power? The biggest barrier to EU great power status is a unified foreign 
policy The EU needs to modify its voting procedures and develop a single representative voice before it 
can have a unified foreign policy Such changes will probably occur but not in the immediate future The 
EU also needs a military capability to become a great power It is currently developing a rapid reaction 
force that will constitute a military capability when it comes to fruition in 2003 A secondary purpose of the 
thesis is to assess the utility of Neo Realist theory for explaining EU security and defense cooperation an 
area in which it has been neglected
*
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Topic Definition
The European Union (EU) brings together fifteen sovereign states in a cooperative institutional 
arrangement Since 1957 when the European Economic Community was created the EU states have 
cooperated extensively in the realm of trade and economics They now have a single currency and a 
common market and they negotiate in trade matters as one through the European Commission Because of 
its member states economic cooperation the EU has become an important economic actor Until recently 
this has been in stark contrast to the EU s role as a political actor The EU has not been a serious political 
entity because it has consistently failed to cooperate in security and defense matters a history I outline at 
the end of this chapter However following some recent developments the EU is now starting to take its 
place on the international political scene At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit the EU made plans to 
develop a rapid reaction force (RRF) of 50 000-60 000 troops so that it will be able to use military means 
to defend its interests in broader Europe It has also developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) which despite some weaknesses often enables it to respond to international events as a single 
entity
As a result of these developments the EU has become the focus of much scholarly interest It comprises 
some of the world s wealthiest and most powerful nations whose collective potential is enormous The EU 
is one of the very few international actors potentially capable of challenging U S hegemony This makes it 
a highly significant force in international politics The EU also has theoretical significance because it is the 
first coalition of states ever to reach the position of a potential great power Therefore it may herald the 
beginning of a new type of political actor joining the rank of importance currently occupied only by states 
It is also theoretically significant because it is the world s most advanced example of cooperation between 
states It provides International Relations (IR) scholars with the challenge of explaining why fifteen states 
are willing to cooperate to such a great extent Considering the changes that have occurred within the EU 
we can no longer relegate it to the sidelines It is an extremely important entity capable of changing both 
the polarity of the international system and our understanding of world politics We must begin to seriously 
consider what its future will be
Is the EU becoming a great power9 This is the question I seek to answer in this thesis To do so I draw upon 
the entena offered by neo realist theorist Kenneth Waltz He argues that a great power achieves that rank 
based upon how it scores in all of these areas population and territory resource endowment economic 
capability political stability and competence and military strength (Waltz 1979 131) The EU 
unambiguously meets four of these five criteria (see Table 1 1) First it has a population of 375 million and 
territory covering 3 14 million square kilometers Second it has large oil reserves particularly in the North 
Sea and off Ireland s south coast coal deposits natural gas reserves and forests among other resources 
Third it has a Gross National Product (GNP) of $8 6 trillion and its share of world trade is about 20 
percent Finally it is made up of fifteen liberal democracies all of which hold regular elections
TABLE 1 1 Comparison of the EU and the United States in some Great Power criteria
Population
Temtoiy
Total Oil Reserves (bbl) 
GNP
United States
276 2 million 
9 166 600 sq km 
24 682 billion 
$7 8 trillion
European Union
374 8 million 
3 137 785 sq km 
6 548 741 billion 
$8 6 trillion
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Share of World Trade 25 percent 20 percent
Source World Desk Reference 1999-2000 statistics Online Dorling Kindersley Publishers
Where the EU falls short of great power status is in Waltz s fifth criterion military strength For this 
reason I analyze whether the EU is developing the military strength required of a great power In Chapter 
3 I assess how much military strength is actually required The combined military strength of the 
individual EU nations already meets the requirements of a great power But the problem is that this power 
has not yet been combined The plans made at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 are exceptional 
because they signal EU willingness to pool military resources I believe that when these plans come to 
fruition which should occur within the next three years the EU would have the military strength required 
elevating it to great power status These are issues I discuss at length m Chapter 5
The EU will not become a great power with greater military strength alone Military strength is 
meaningless without the political capacity to decide when to use it In the case of an actor like the EU a 
sixth criterion needs to be added to Waltz s list a unified foreign policy This is presumed to exist for any 
state but we cannot make the same presumption when analyzing a non state actor Another question I 
examine therefore is whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy Although the EU has a CFSP 
this does not yet constitute a unified foreign policy A unified foreign policy must consistently produce a 
single policy position which can be articulated to the outside world by an authoritative representative 
Because it has a general principle of unanimity voting and because it has no single voice the CFSP does 
not fulfill these requirements However since its inception the CFSP has undergone considerable reform I 
am optimistic that it will continue to do so particularly as the EU prepares for enlargement and the 
possibility of twice the membership Although it may take a number of years I believe the CFSP will 
eventually meet the requirements of the unified foreign policy criterion On this point I disagree with 
Waltz who argues that the EU will only have the foreign policy unity required of a great power if it 
becomes a state (Waltz 1993 52) I believe that the EU can achieve sufficient unity in foreign policy 
matters and still comprise fifteen sovereign states These are issues I discuss at length in Chapter 4
The term foreign policy traditionally refers to the plans and actions of national governments toward 
external actors (Rosenau 1987 3) Because it is viewed as an act of government it is considered exclusive 
to states (Allen 1998a, 43) In this thesis I employ a meaning of foreign policy which is both broader and 
narrower than this On the one hand I adopt a broader meaning because the EU is clearly not a state with a 
government yet it is capable of formulating foreign policy Therefore I extend the meaning to encompass 
non state actors like the EU At the same time I adopt a narrower meaning of foreign policy Foreign 
policy typically refers to any position taken toward the external world It embodies trade policy and foreign 
aid policy as well as security and defense policy (Soetendorp 1999 2) I focus solely upon the security and 
defense end of the foreign policy spectrum because this is the area in which the EU falls short of great 
power status
Thesis Aims and Significance
This thesis has empirical and theoretical ambitions The empirical ambition is to determine whether the EU 
is becoming a great power This involves answering two questions Is the EU developing a unified foreign 
policy7 And is the EU developing the requisite military strength7 I do this in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively My conclusion is that considering that the EU will probably develop its rapid reaction force 
within the next few years it is the absence of a unified foreign policy which is the biggest barrier to EU 
great power status The EU must reform its CFSP before it can have a unified foreign policy At this stage 
there are no concrete plans to do so
The theoretical ambition is to explain EU security and defense cooperation using Neo realism As the 
dominant paradigm in international security studies Neo realism is a logical theoretical framework to adopt 
(Vasquez 1997 902 Katzenstein 1996 xii) Surprisingly though it is a neglected framework in the study
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of EU security affairs In this context Neo realism has been criticized for being too state centric It 
overlooks the importance of institutions and focuses too heavily upon structural dynamics (Peterson and 
Sjursen 1998 Sjursen 1999 37-38 Duke 2000 9-11 Long 1997 198 Bretherton and Vogler 1999 24 
Becker 1998 13 Taylor 1996 169 van Ham 1996 188 Keohane 1996 233) Such criticism has mainly 
come from the liberal institutionalized school of thought which is optimistic about the prospects of state 
cooperation through institutions and which highlights the importance of non state actors It claims that with 
Neo realism s emphasis upon state actors it cannot accommodate a non state actor like the EU This 
criticism has tended to treat Neo realism very cursorily and it has also overlooked the diversity of thought 
within Neo realism As I discuss in Chapter 3 Neo realism comprises offensive and defensive variants 
Defensive Neo realism explains EU security cooperation better than offensive Neo realism a point I 
discuss at length in Chapter 6 Nevertheless the criticism of Neo realism within the EU security cooperation 
literature reacts only to offensive Neo realist arguments In this thesis I correct the dismissal of Neo realism 
in the literature by drawing upon the theory in its entirety
This thesis is significant for two reasons First it sheds light upon the likelihood of the EU becoming a 
great power which has important ramifications for international relations more broadly The number of 
great powers determines the polarity of the international system which in turn can affect the behavior of 
states (Rosenau and Durfee 2000 24) Some scholars argue that a bipolar system is more likely to produce 
peace because it introduces stability and certainty into international relations (Mearsheimer 1990 7)
Others insist that multi polarity can be just as peaceful (Van Evera 1990 33-40) Regardless of which 
argument is more plausible the polarity of the system is essential to understanding state behavior To gain 
insight into the future of international politics we must have some idea of which actors are likely to 
emerge alongside the United States as great powers
Second this thesis makes a contribution to international relations theory in its assessment of Neo realism 
There is a dearth of literature applying Neo realism to the field of EU security and defense cooperation 
Although Neo realism has been used extensively to understand states security it has been judged 
inapplicable to the EU But the EU is as much a product of states cooperating as it is an actor in its own 
right If Neo realism is a useful theoretical tool it should be able to help explain EU security cooperation 
By applying Neo realism to this research topic I am able to reach conclusions about whether this paradigm 
is in fact helpful for understanding EU security and defense cooperation In doing so I refine Neo realism
The Evolution of Security Cooperation 
in the European Union
In the past few years there has been an enormous momentum towards security cooperation within the EU 
Understanding this momentum requires a brief discussion of past efforts in this field European security 
cooperation has been an arduous process dating back almost fifty years In 1952 the six member states of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (Belgium the Netherlands Luxembourg West Germany Italy 
and France) established the European Defense Community (EDC) The EDC stemmed from Jean Monnet s 
idea that Europe should strengthen its collective military potential against an increasing Soviet threat The 
EDC envisaged the creation of a common European army with troops supplied by the six members These 
forces were to be accompanied by the European Political Community established in 1953 which set up 
federal type political institutions (Eliassen 1998 3 Bretherton and Vogler 1999 173 Missiroli 1999 22)
These efforts at security integration would be short lived The EDC Treaty stalled in the French Parliament 
in 1954 primarily because of the supranational nature of the Treaty (Council of the European Union 1999) 
However the French did indicate a willingness to cooperate at an intergovernmental level I foreign and 
security policy through the Fouchet Plan of 1961 In sharp contrast to the federalist provisions of the EDC 
the intention in the Fouchet Plan was to curtail supranationalem by undermining the role of the European 
Community (EC) institutions in particular the European Commission (Bretherton and Vogler 1999 174 
Dalel999) The Fouchet Plan collapsed in 1962 when the members failed to reach a consensus on British 
involvement (Cameron 1999 16)
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The Luxembourg Report of 1970 unambiguously favored cooperation on an intergovernmental basis 
operating entirely outside the EC framework This marked the beginning of European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) which related exclusively to foreign policy and lasted until 1993 EPC involved regular consultation 
between national foreign ministers supported by a political committee All EPC meetings took place in the 
capital of the country holding the EC presidency This changed in 1986 when the Single European Act 
which gave EPC a formal treaty basis established an EPC Secretariat in Brussels (Cameron 1999 17)
EPC was superseded in 1993 by the CFSP This was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
(also known as the Maastricht Treaty) which as its name suggests created the European Union CFSP 
like EPC is based upon intergovernmental decision making It constitutes the second pillar of the European 
Union which is based upon a tripartite pillar structure The first pillar consists of the European 
Community and the third pillar is dedicated to Justice and Home Affairs Article 17 of the TEU states that 
the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union including the eventual framing of 
a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense (see Appendix)
The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam clarified and strengthened the TEU provisions on CFSP Its most 
significant changes include the increased use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the introduction of 
constructive abstention to try to overcome the difficulty and inflexibility of unanimity voting the 
creation of the new post of High Representative (HR) which was intended to give the CFSP a higher 
profile and make it more coherent and consistent and the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit (PPEWU) designed to give the EU an independent common planning and analysis capability 
(Peterson 1998 9)
Recent Momentum
Since its first attempt at political cooperation the EU has been under constant criticism for its inability to 
formulate a single voice and respond effectively to external developments threatening its security 
However the last couple of years has produced significant momentum towards the development of a 
unified foreign policy and a military capability The decision at the December 1999 Helsinki European 
Council to create a 50 000-60 000 person rapid reaction force is a clear example of this (Presidency of the 
European Union 1999b)
Considering the relative inertia of EU security cooperation since the 1950s this momentum is surprising It 
can be explained by four factors First, since the end of the Cold War the EU has become increasingly 
disturbed by its military reliance upon the United States It has assumed that with the Soviet threat gone 
Washington will want to wind down its military presence in Europe leaving the EU to develop its own 
capability The end of bipolarity has also led to a greater divergence in EU and U S interests The Soviet 
threat gave a consistency to the security interests of Europe and the United States which no longer exists 
While there is still broad agreement on many issues the EU is more sensitive than it previously was about 
its dependence upon the United States
Second its inability to act m the Kosovo war made the EU fully cognizant of its heavy reliance upon the 
United States and die poor state of its own military assets It simply lacked the military hardware to 
contribute more than a small fraction of the aircraft bombs and munitions needed to defeat Slobodan 
Milosevic Instead the EU resorted to economic embargoes and diplomatic measures Since Kosovo the 
EU has realized that if it wants its diplomacy to be more effective and it wants to protect itself against 
security threats in its own backyard it must create an independent military force (Pond 1999a)
Third the EU has emerged as a significant economic power and now wants to adopt a commensurate 
political role (Council of the European Union 1999) The EU has a borderless market a single currency 
and worldwide trade relations Integration in the economic realm has sparked a desire for further integration 
in the security sphere As integrationists often note this is the final frontier in cooperation The EU will 
never possess full international credibility until it takes this last step
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Finally there has been a dramatic shift in the British attitude toward European security and defense 
cooperation This change can be attributed to the preferences of Prime Minister Tony Blair whose thinking 
marks a sharp break from the anti European rhetoric and policies of his conservative predecessors Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major Blair wants to see the EU emerge as a capable political entity In a recent speech 
he commented that the EU can in its economic and political strength be a superpower (Blair 2000)
These are strong words from the leader of a country which has been opposed to a politically powerful EU 
for so long With Britain on board the push toward EU security cooperation no longer emanates mainly 
from France s efforts to minimize United States influence The EU now has a more unified approach 
which is a vital component of any security cooperation
Thesis Structure
In Chapter 2 I conduct a literature review which identifies the dearth of theoretical literature examining 
EU security cooperation Most of the literature is either purely descriptive or normative The very small 
percentage which is theoretical mostly stems from the l iberal institutionalist school of thought In this 
chapter I more closely examine the broad rejection of Neo realism in the EU security context
Then in Chapter 3 I examine the core assumptions of Neo realism and separate the paradigm into its 
offensive and defensive variants to capture more thoroughly the full spectrum of Neo realist thought I 
particularly focus upon how each variant explains cooperation between states and the role of institutions 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that Neo realism is more diverse than many analysts give it credit for In this 
chapter I also detail my methodology which centers on Waltz s five criteria of great power and the sixth 
criterion I have added
Chapters 4 and 5 constitute the empirical section of the thesis Here I put theoretical considerations aside 
In these chapters I answer the two questions Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy9 And is the EU 
developing the requisite military capability9 In Chapter 4 I examine the CFSP and assess whether it 
constitutes a unified foreign policy My conclusion is that it does not because it lacks sufficient external 
representation However it could develop into a unified foreign policy with some institutional reform and 
with further state cooperation In Chapter 5 I assess the EU s defense capability My conclusion is that if 
the 1999 plans for a rapid reaction force eventuate and I am confident that they will the EU will have the 
requisite military capability
In Chapter 6 I assess the utility of Neo realism in this research context and make refinements to it In this 
way the theory is made progressive I also address the main question of whether the EU is becoming a 
great power My conclusion is that even though the EU will possess the requisite military capability when 
its plans for a crisis management force come to fruition it still does not possess a unified foreign policy 
The EU must reform its CFSP before it can achieve great power status In the concluding sections of the 
thesis I discuss the implications of my analysis for the theory and practice of international politics
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on EU security cooperation is more voluminous than theoretically rigorous Much of the 
literature is purely descriptive with a particular focus upon the EU institutions and the changes 
implemented by the EU treaties A great deal of it is normative and centers around the debate over whether 
or not the EU should develop a security and defense dimension A smaller percentage of the literature 
provides a theoretical contribution to the study of the EU s security cooperation most of which stems from 
the liberal school of thought Neo realism is virtually neglected in this field of study In this thesis I use 
Neo realist theory to explain EU security and defense cooperation and thereby address both the dearth of 
theoretical literature and the neglect of Neo realism
I Descriptive Literature
Because the EU is a relatively new entity that is constantly changing and maturing a body of literature has 
emerged devoted purely to describing its latest developments in the security realm Much of the descriptive 
literature emanates from the EU itself The EU has several web sites which detail its developments and 
offer access to important primary sources such as Presidency Conclusions and treaty texts The web sites of 
both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) also provide helpful primary sources For the very 
latest news newspaper articles are also a good source More and more of these can be obtained over the 
Internet
A number of monographs and chapters within monographs describes security and defense affairs in the EU 
(Forster and Wallace 1996 411-435 Regelsberger Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wessels 1997 Holland 
1994 Henderson 1999 Cameron 1999 Jorgensen 1998 79-94 Flockhart 1998 Edwards and Nuttall 1994 
84-103 Pryce 1994 36-52) Many of the sources focus upon the institutions of the EU and the various 
roles they play in the CFSP as well as the changes implemented as a result of the Amsterdam Treaty All in 
all the descriptive literature on EU security provides detailed overviews of the institutional mechanisms 
underpinning the CFSP but little analysis of the CFSP s broader significance
II Normative Literature
Much of the normative literature describes the current security and defense dimension of the EU and then 
contributes to the debate over whether or not the EU should continue developing this dimension One 
school of thought or another usually implicitly guides the authors Those who caution against the 
development of a military capability and unified foreign policy usually base their stance on two arguments 
First some say that the EU s strength lies in the fact that it has thus far been a civilian power It has 
proved to the world that force is unnecessary and in doing so encourages the spread of peace From this 
perspective the EU should put its efforts into developing diplomatic adeptness and encouraging 
democratization throughout Europe (Rosecrance 1998 Smith 1998) This argument is clearly influenced by 
liberal thinking but is not in itself theoretically sophisticated
The second argument cautions against the development of an independent security and defense dimension 
Scholars making this point contend that a limited defense capability is acceptable so long as it is created 
alongside the United States within the context of NATO It can be used for humanitarian missions and to 
provide EU diplomacy with some teeth In this view a more robust EU can also help balance out an 
alliance where the United States currently carries a disproportionate burden However some fear that if the 
EU develops its own foreign policy and military it could emerge as a competitor against the United States 
If the EU and the United States continue to cooperate in the defense and security realm no balance of 
power will emerge between the two and peace is more likely (Garter 1998) This is an Atlanticist point of
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view which runs contrary to the Europeanist one arguing for the development of an independent force 
More broadly it is also liberal
On the other side of the debate are those who encourage the full development of an EU security and 
defense dimension Their argument is basically that this is essential to the EU if it is to emerge as an 
international actor As Helene Sjursen says From this perspective the issue of autonomy and 
independence is primordial and the ability of the EU to act in the security and defense realm is seen as a 
fundamental component of the EU s political identity (Sjursen 1998 98-99) However this position does 
not necessarily advocate a termination of Europe s alliance with the United States Many authors have 
stressed that while the EU should be a capable political actor it should assure the United States that its 
intentions are benign and work to keep strong Trans Atlantic ties (Kupchan 2000) Though it is not 
explicitly stated this normative argument stems from the realist school of thought It is also a position 
favored by Europeamsts
III Theoretical Literature
There is a dearth of theoretical literature examining security and defense within the EU This is somewhat 
difficult to understand Some scholars suggest that the sui generis nature of the EU make the use of 
traditional theories obsolete The EU is pre theory in this regard (Peterson and Sjursen 1998 170 
Bretherton and Vogler 1999) This reasoning is unsatisfactory A new entity like the EU provides 
International Relations scholars with a good opportunity to test the explanatory utility of established 
theories If a theory cannot explain the empirical data then it needs to be refined Abandoning theory 
altogether is not a sound alternative
Liberalism
Most of the theoretical literature on EU security is broadly located m the liberal paradigm (Moravcsik 
1993 Long 1997 and Soetendorp 1999) Liberal institutionalism explains security and defense cooperation 
in the EU by focusing upon the role of institutions It suggests that institutions are not simply outcomes of 
state preferences but that they have an independent quality that enables them to shape state preferences 
prompting further cooperation (McKenzie and Loedel 1998 11) From this point of view the rules and 
norms that were originally adopted by the EU member states have tempered any competitiveness and 
provoked their desire for further cooperation Integration theory views the most recent developments as part 
of the broader process of economic and political integration It argues that one step towards integration 
spills over into another and that the integrative process will continue until full political union results 
(Haas 1958 Taylor 1989)
Neo realism
Despite the fact that it is generally regarded as the dominant paradigm in security studies Neo realism has 
been virtually disregarded in the study of EU security cooperation Following the end of the Cold War two 
prominent Neo realists Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer made predictions about European affairs 
but both wrote prior to the creation of the EU and thus their contribution has not filled this gap in the 
literature Mearsheimer was pessimistic about European cooperation He predicted that Europe would be 
substantially more prone to violence under the multi polarity of the post Cold War era than it has been 
since World War II He was not confident that institutions could overcome conflict between the European 
states (Mearsheimer 1990)
Waltz predicted that Germany or a West European state might rise to great power rank The fact that he 
foresaw the possibility of Western Europe making the collective decision to become a single state is
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telling It suggests that, according to Waltzian Neo realist logic state cooperation in security affairs is 
possible indeed even that states will pool their sovereignty to achieve security (Waltz 1993)
In a 2000 article Waltz revisits the notion of a European power-this time the EU or a German led 
coalition-rising to great power status He suggests this will not occur in the absence of radical change 
(essentially Europe becoming a state) He is dubious about the prospects of this and therefore predicts a 
European great power is unlikely (Waltz 2000 31-32) I believe the EU could be a great power and retain 
an intergovernmental system a point I will discuss further in Chapter 4 Nevertheless Waltz s article is the 
only Neo realist piece that discusses EU security cooperation However it does so only very briefly and 
does not conduct a discussion of the theoretical considerations behind EU security cooperation Therefore I 
do not consider that it fills the gap in the literature
Most analysts conclude that Neo realism is an inappropriate theoretical tool in the study of EU security 
(Duke 2000 9 Bretherton and Vogler 1999 24 Becker 1998 13 Taylor 1994 169) This rejection of 
Neo realism is based on two mam criticisms first that it does not take sufficient account of international 
institutions and second that it cannot adequately explain cooperation between states These criticisms are 
only valid however when a very small slice of Neo realist thought is considered As I shall discuss in the 
next chapter Neo realism embodies a diverse range of thinking about cooperation between states It is not 
limited to the arguments of aggressive or offensive Neo realists like Mearsheimer It also includes the 
thoughts of defensive Neo realists such as Stephen Walt (1987) Robert Jervis (1999) and Charles Glaser 
(1994-1995) which are more optimistic about the prospect of state cooperation If Neo realism is 
represented properly the standard criticisms are invalid
In sum most of the literature on EU security cooperation is descriptive or normative The small amount of 
theoretical literature largely stems from the liberal school of thought In this thesis I will use Neo realism to 
assess EU cooperation in the security realm In doing so I will address the two imbalances in the literature 
first, the scarcity of theoretical literature and second within the theoretical literature itself the dearth of 
Neo realist theory
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THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Neo realism is the dominant paradigm in international security studies As such it would seem to be a 
logical starting point for understanding EU security cooperation Surprisingly Neo realism is a neglected 
paradigm in this field of study It has been rejected mainly because of the widespread belief that it is unable 
to account for cooperation between the EU states and the impact of the EU institutions upon its members 
But this rejection rests on a flawed understanding of the paradigm There is more to Neo realism than the 
arguments of John Mearsheimer Mearsheimer is an offensive Neo realist and as such he sees the world 
in a more competitive and pessimistic light than his defensive Neo realist counterparts Defensive Neo 
realists are able to explain cooperation between the EU states and the role of EU institutions better than 
offensive Neo realists In this chapter I examine the core assumptions of Neo realism and then explain their 
different interpretations by the two Neo realist variants I particularly focus upon the two variants 
explanation of state cooperation and the role of institutions These two Neo realist schools provide the 
framework for my subsequent analysis of EU security cooperation
In this chapter I also discuss the methodological approach I have adopted in this thesis To answer the 
question Is the EU becoming a great power'? I have drawn upon the methodology offered by Kenneth 
Waltz the founder of Neo realism Waltz uses a set of five criteria to determine great power population 
and territory resource endowment economic capability political stability and competence and military 
strength (Waltz 1979 131) I focus only upon one of these military strength In the case of the EU the 
other four are fulfilled I have modified Waltz s methodological framework by adding a sixth criterion a 
unified foreign policy As I discuss below this criterion fits well within the Neo realist approach
I Neo realist Theory
The Assumptions of Neo realism
Realism is a general approach to international politics not a single theory It dates back as far as 
Thucydides the chronicler of the ancient Peloponnesian Wars who wrote The strong do what they have 
the power to do the weak accept what they have to accept (Thucydides 1978 402) Neo realism draws on 
Realist core beliefs to build a deductive social scientific theory of international politics
Neo realists base their understanding of the world upon four key assumptions First anarchy (the absence 
of any common sovereign) is the distinguishing feature of international politics Without a central authority 
to guarantee states security a self help system exists where states must rely upon their own means to 
protect their interests In this anarchic international system security is the highest goal of states
Second states are the most important actors in the international system While non state actors (NSAs) like 
corporations and multinational organizations do play an important role the state is paramount Neo realism 
is often criticized for overlooking the importance of NSAs But this is a mischaracterization of Neo 
realism As Waltz says The importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are 
obvious Parsimony is an essential part of theory though As Waltz explains States are not and never 
have been the only international actors But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish 
within them but by the major ones (Waltz 1986a 88)
Third states are rational actors Robert Keohane explains this term To say governments act rationally 
means that they have consistent ordered preferences and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all 
alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their 
perceptions of the nature of reality (Keohane 1986a, 11) Neo realists point out that the preferences of
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states are strongly constrained by the anarchy in the international system which makes security the most 
important preference of any state Although states are rational they may miscalculate from time to time 
because they operate in a world of imperfect information (Mearsheimer 1994-1995 337)
Fourth states are unitary actors States do not speak to the rest of the world through multiple voices 
Although there may be domestic disputes over a particular policy direction only one policy will be directed 
internationally (Rosenau and Durfee 2000 14) For this reason Neo realists argue that domestic dynamics 
are inconsequential for explaining state interaction This does not mean however that analysis must always 
remain at the structural level Neo realism freely admits that to get a complete explanation of any event a 
unit level or individual level of analysis may be used (Waltz 1979 126 Buzan 1996 51) In fact Waltz 
insists that a complete understanding of international politics cannot be reached without looking at 
domestic factors
Beyond these four assumptions there are differences of opinion within Neo realism This is particularly the 
case regarding the role of institutions and the prospect of cooperation between states Dividing Neo realist 
scholars into offensive and defensive composites captures this variation of thought well
Offensive Neo realism
Offensive Neo realists believe that the international system promotes aggression and conflict It is a brutal 
arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and have little reason to trust each 
other (Mearsheimer 1994-1995 336) Security is scarce making international competition intense and war 
likely Rational states are often compelled to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security Mutual 
security is rarely sought or cannot be gained states have security requirements that are incompatible with 
other states or they are willing to risk war to expand (Lynn-Jones and Miller 1995 xi Jervis 1999) Power 
is the most important factor in international relations because the more power states have the less likely 
they will be overcome by other states States seek to maximize power and also seek to balance the power of 
other states Mearsheimer provides the preeminent example of an offensive Neo realist Waltz displays 
some characteristics of both offensive and defensive Neo realism and has been described as having a foot 
in both camps (Snyder 1991 12n36)
A The Prospects for State Cooperation
Offensive Neo realists are pessimistic about state cooperation but they do not rule it out altogether The 
balance of power will often produce cooperation in the form of alliances but any alliance must be viewed 
in temporary terms Because of the self help system which arises from international anarchy no state can 
entirely depend upon another for security According to Mearsheimer alliances are only temporary 
marriages of convenience where today s alliance partner might be tomorrow s enemy and today s enemy 
might be tomorrow s alliance partner (Mearsheimer 1994-1995 338) For this reason cooperation is 
likely to be short lived and no state can become reliant upon it Because cooperation is constrained by the 
dominating logic of security competition it will always be difficult States are not rewarded for trusting 
each other in a self help system and so no amount of cooperation will override the presence of 
international competition According to Mearsheimer there is no such thing as a status quo power that 
is a power which is content with the amount of security it has All states have aggressive intentions 
although not all states will have the capabilities to act upon those intentions
According to offensive Neo realism cooperation is inhibited by two main factors relative gains 
considerations and concern about cheating both of which stem from the logic of anarchy (Mearsheimer 
1994-1995 339 Gneco 1990 28) When a state contemplates cooperation it can think about it in terms of 
absolute gains which means the state cares only about what it gams from the cooperation Or it can think 
about it in terms of relative gains which means the state considers how well it does compared to the other 
side According to offensive Neo realists in an anarchic and competitive world states try to maximize
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power to survive Therefore they must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering 
cooperation This makes cooperation difficult because no state will want to do worse than the state it is 
cooperating with
Randall Schweller responds to this reasoning by pointing out that while state A might be relatively worse 
off by cooperating with state B it could be better off vis a vis all outsiders to the agreement If A turned 
down cooperation with B based on relative gains considerations B might cooperate with C leaving A 
worse off in absolute and relative terms (Schweller 1996 109-110) This is a strong retort to the offensive 
Neo realist position on cooperation and one which I shall address in Chapter 6 in the context of EU 
security cooperation
The second factor inhibiting cooperation according to offensive Neo realists is concern over cheating The 
reasoning here is that states are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other 
side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage In a world where there is no ultimate arbiter 
this will always be a possibility
B The Role of Institutions
The title of Mearsheimer s article The False Promise of International Institutions sums up the offensive 
Neo realist position on institutions (1994-1995) In this article Mearsheimer concludes that institutions 
have minimal influence on state behavior Defined as a set of rules that stipulate the way in which states 
should cooperate and compete with each other institutions according to Mearsheimer merely reflect state 
calculations of self interest States operate through institutions but they are not shaped by those 
institutions Institutions do not have an independent quality they only mirror the distribution of power in 
the international system (Mearsheimer 1994-1995 340)
Not only are institutions exclusively dependent upon states but they also matter very little according to 
offensive Neo realists They do not promote peace and placing too much reliance upon them can simply 
have pernicious effects (Mearsheimer 1995 376) Basically offensive Neo realism views the world as a 
place of extensive competition between states which is barely modified by the presence of institutions
In the spectrum of thinking about the role of institutions this position sits at one end The position at the 
other end of the spectrum is that occupied by liberal institutionalists who contend that institutions can take 
on a life of their own and shape the interests of their members (McKenzie and Loedel 1998 11 ) 
Defensive Neo realists occupy a position somewhere between these two
Defensive Neo realism
Unlike offensive Neo realists defensive Neo realists do not believe that the international system 
necessarily generates war and conflict States that understand the international system will realize that 
security is plentiful and that defensive strategies are the best route to security From this viewpoint two 
potential competitors would be happy with the status quo of mutual security Conflict results when one 
side s attempts to increase security are viewed externally as acts of aggression This is the security dilemma 
(Taliaferro 2000-2001 129) International politics represents tragedy rather than evil Of course states do 
act aggressively sometimes and when this happens conflict is unavoidable (Jervis 1999 49) Rather than 
focusing upon the state s search for power defensive Neo realists emphasize the search for security They 
do not see an automatic relationship between power and security in the same way that offensive Neo 
realists do (Waltz 1993 Mearsheimer 1990) Defensive Neo realists argue that the level and direction of 
threat is more important than the distribution of power The quintessential defensive Neo realist piece is 
The Origins o f Alliances written by Stephen Walt (1987) Other defensive Neo realists include Charles 
Glaser Stephen Van Evera, Robert Jervis and occasionally Waltz
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A The Prospects for State Cooperation
Defensive Neo realists argue that states seek security not power per se For this reason there are good 
prospects for cooperation Competition is not an inevitable logical consequence of Neo realism s basic 
assumptions (Glaser 1995 378) Cooperation is possible where two status quo powers face each other in a 
security dilemma, but not where a status quo power faces a revisionist power In the former situation 
security will be made more likely where there is increased transparency where the gams from cheating and 
the costs from being cheated on are low where mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection and 
where each side employs strategies of reciprocity (Jervis 1999 52) Defensive Neo realists seek to overturn 
the competition bias established by offensive Neo realism by illustrating the range of cooperative options 
available to states
B The Role of Institutions
There is divergence within the defensive Neo realist composite about whether institutions have causal 
significance This can be illustrated by reference to the arguments of Glaser and Jervis Glaser understands 
cooperation between states as a product of the international system He argues that offensive Neo realist 
predictions about the limits of cooperation rest on flawed deductions from Neo realism s core assumptions 
According to Glaser because security not power is the highest goal of states and cooperating will often 
be the best way to achieve security cooperation follows deductively from Neo realist assumptions 
Because Glaser sees cooperation as arising logically from anarchy he does not grant a special role to 
institutions Like Mearsheimer he argues that they are dependent upon state preferences (Glaser 1995 
411)
Jervis on the other hand argues that institutions can play a special role He argues that when the actors 
have limited foresight institutions can be autonomous by affecting actors preferences over outcomes He 
argues that when states enter institutional arrangements they will often seek to bind others and even 
themselves to behave in certain ways in the future only rarely will they seek to alter their preferences over 
outcomes This however is an unintended consequence of institutions Not only do they bind the members 
more than the founders foresaw they would but they also change beliefs about what is possible and 
desirable (Jervis 1999)
Defensive Neo realists generally argue that states are willing to cooperate extensively through institutions 
Though this requires transferring some of their sovereignty states are willing to do this Waltz s suggestion 
that the EU could become a single state shows that from his view states could potentially cooperate to the 
point of transferring all their sovereignty to an institution Defensive Neo realists broadly agree that 
institutions are outcomes of their members interests but they also provide a forum for extensive 
cooperation which does make them significant They disagree with Mearsheimer s assertion that institution 
matter very little
These differences between the two Neo realist composites illustrate the inadequacy of judging Neo realism 
solely upon the arguments of Mearsheimer As an offensive Neo realist Mearsheimer has a pessimistic 
view of international politics He sees the world as an extremely competitive place prone to conflict Neo 
realism embodies more diverse views than this though In its defensive variant, it finds that cooperation 
between states is a likely outcome when they do not behave aggressively Unlike offensive Neo realism it 
also considers institutions significant though generally dependent I shall draw upon these variants in 
Chapter 6 in order to understand EU security cooperation
II Methodology
To address the question of whether the EU is becoming a great power I draw on the entena offered by 
Waltz for great power status population and territory resource endowment economic capability political
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stability and competence and military strength (Waltz 1979 131) As I discussed in Chapter 1 the EU 
already meets four of these criteria, but as a single entity it currently lacks military strength Thus I seek to 
answer the question Is the EU developing a requisite military capability9 The second question I address is 
Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy9 I believe this is an important sixth criterion that needs to be 
added to Waltz s list when a non state actor is being considered As noted Waltz agrees that this criterion 
should be added for clarity
The Sixth Criterion A Unified Foreign Policy
In Waltz s framework for understanding what makes a great power he refers specifically to states The EU 
is clearly not a state and to understand whether it is developing as a great power some consideration needs 
to be made of how it differs from a state An obvious source of difference is foreign policy As I discussed 
in the previous section Neo realism assumes that states are unitary actors They speak with one voice and 
direct one foreign policy to the world Although the EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) its member states also retain separate foreign policies Waltz seems to suggest that so long as these 
fifteen different policies exist alongside an EU policy the EU will not become a great power He says that 
only if the EU makes the collective decision to become a single state will it take this step (Waltz 1993 
52) Waltz believes that the EU needs to be a state to become a great power because only states have central 
governments with enough authority to make the foreign policy decisions required of a great power He 
argues that any entity short of a state is unlikely to have the necessary decision making capabilities Waltz 
concedes however that this is a question open to further research and examination
I do not agree with Waltz that the EU needs to be a single state to be a great power It does need a unified 
foreign policy so that it can act authoritatively but this does not require its transformation into a state A 
unified foreign policy provides only one external position which is represented by a central authoritative 
body or figure In the case of states governments provide this A foreign policy position must be accepted 
domestically whether it is approved of or not For example a national peace movement may disapprove of 
its country s decision to go to war but it nevertheless acknowledges that the decision is binding upon the 
state But a state is not necessarily the only actor able to formulate foreign policy Any actor who meets the 
requirement of unity could conceivably possess a foreign policy
In this thesis I call this sixth criterion of great power a unified foreign policy Using the simpler term 
foreign policy is inadequate because the EU already has a Common Foreign and Security Policy The 
CFSP at this stage does not meet the requirements of a unified foreign policy because it does not 
consistently produce a single policy position which adequately represents the fifteen EU members and it 
lacks an authoritative voice These are issues I take up in Chapter 4
Waltz s requirement that the EU must become a single state before it can be considered a great power is a 
threshold that in my opinion is too high Of course allowing the member states to retain some autonomy 
potentially creates divisiveness but this need not be any different from the domestic competitions which 
arise with the formulation of a state s foreign policy Domestically one voice always wins over the others 
The other points of view remain but they are not expressed externally The same goes for an entity like the 
EU Each member state may have differing opinions about which foreign policy stance should prevail but 
as long as one position eventually prevails and no other position is adopted to undermine it this should be 
enough to place the EU into the category of a great power If the EU has a collective position which can be 
backed by an adequate military capability (the fifth great power criterion) then considering its rating in 
other entena, it would be a great power
The Fifth Criterion Requisite Military Capability
To determine whether the EU meets the fifth criterion I establish an appropriate standard of military 
strength Three important points influence the formulation of this standard First, the rank of great power
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depends upon how an actor scores on a combination of the criteria set out by Waltz (Waltz 1993 48) 
Therefore if an actor is particularly strong in a few areas it can be less strong in the others and still be 
ranked as a great power The EU is a very strong economic actor According to Waltz this is a particularly 
important attribute of great power without a considerable economic capability no state can hope to 
sustain a world role (Waltz 1993 48) For this reason the EU need not rely so much on military strength 
the way for example the Soviet Union needed to (Waltz 1993 48-49) Of course military strength is 
important As Waltz says no state lacking the military ability to compete with other great powers has ever 
been ranked among them (Waltz 1993 52) But it need not be an actor s main strength if it rates well in 
other areas
Second nuclear weapons are particularly important in the calculation of military strength In his analysis of 
whether or not Japan and Germany will emerge as great powers Waltz assesses whether either will obtain 
nuclear weapons (Waltz 1993) Although he says that nuclear weapons alone do not make states into great 
powers a nuclear capable secondary power can become great Nuclear weapons make the size of an 
actor s conventional forces less important So long as an actor has enough nuclear force to adopt a deterrent 
strategy then large conventional forces are unnecessary Some conventional force is required but only 
enough to act as a trip wire that is only enough to require the adversary to attack on a scale large 
enough to reveal the extent of its aggressive intentions (Waltz 1993 50) When an aggressor s intentions 
are revealed to a nuclear power that power has the option of stopping the aggressor with nuclear weapons 
This knowledge deters potential aggressors Even a small nuclear force provides deterrence because as 
Bernard Brodie explains Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of 
the advent of newer and superior types (Brodie 1973 321)
Third military strength does not just protect a power from attack it also enables a power to carry out its 
foreign policy An actor s military capability should be measured according to its interests and the security 
threats it faces Since the end of the Cold War Western Europe s main concerns have shifted from the 
Soviet Union to the more diverse threats in Central and Eastern Europe Among the most serious of these 
new threats are political and economic instability (for example in several Balkan countries) ethnic and 
border problems (Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia) terrorism organized crime and environmental 
degradation In order to protect its interests in places like Kosovo the EU must have the conventional 
military force to back up its diplomatic efforts m a wider European context
These three points enable me to formulate a standard for measuring the military strength criterion Because 
the EU rates so well in the other areas of great power particularly economic strength it need not have 
overwhelming military strength like the Soviet Union needed in order to compensate for its economic 
weaknesses If the EU is covered by nuclear deterrence it does not require a large conventional force 
either It only needs a conventional force big enough to act as a trip wire and to protect its interests and 
support its diplomacy in wider Europe Using this standard allows me to reach the conclusion in Chapter 5 
that the EU is developing the requisite military capability
Determining whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy and a military capability enables me to 
address the question Is the EU becoming a great power1? At this point in time there is only one great power 
on the international scene—the United States If the EU were to become a great power it would join the 
United States ranks This would change the polarity of the international system which has important 
ramifications for the behavior of all states
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IS THE EU DEVELOPING A UNIFIED FOREIGN POLICY9
The sixth criterion for determining whether an actor is a great power is the presence of a unified foreign 
policy This criterion is unnecessary when examining states but not when assessing a non state entity like 
the EU At this point in time the EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) In the first 
section of this chapter I will explain how this falls short of a unified foreign policy as I defined it in Chapter 
3 To do so I will provide an overview of how the CFSP operates In the second section I will determine 
the likelihood of the CFSP developing into a unified foreign policy This requires assessing the impact of 
EU enlargement and the likelihood of CFSP reform If the EU reduces unanimity voting on CFSP matters 
and provides the CFSP with a single voice then its prospects for developing a unified foreign policy are 
good
I The Current Absence of a Unified Foreign Policy in the EU
As I discussed in Chapter 3 the defining quality of foreign policy is that it is unified This means that it 
consists of only one external position Domestically there is always a range of differing opinions about the 
best course of action Foreign policy distills these opinions and formulates a single position Outsiders must 
be able to rely upon this single position as the direction that the actor will take Outsiders must also be able 
to obtain this position from an authoritative foreign policy representative In the case of states governments 
fulfill this role
I will examine four key aspects of the CFSP in order to explain why it does not satisfy the requirements of 
a unified foreign policy First I will look at the two treaties which created the CFSP the TEU (Maastricht 
Treaty) and the Amsterdam Treaty Second I examine the agents of the CFSP including among others the 
fifteen EU member states the European Council the Council of the European Union and the Presidency 
Third I discuss the CFSP instruments in particular common strategies common positions and joint 
actions and fourth the CFSP decision making procedures particularly the voting methods within the 
CFSP
1) The CFSP Treaties
The EU is founded not upon a constitution but upon international treaties among sovereign nations It 
differs from an international organization though because it has the power to enact laws that are directly 
binding on all EU citizens throughout the EU territory (Davidson 1994 6) The CFSP was brought into 
existence by Title V of the TEU Its objectives as stated in Article 11 include safeguarding the common 
values fundamental interests and independence of the Union strengthening the security of the Union and 
its member states in all ways and promoting international cooperation The EU was to pursue these 
broad objectives by establishing systemic cooperation between member states More controversial is the 
TEU that deals with the possibility of a defense dimension within the CFSP via Article 14 It states that the 
CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union including the eventual framing of a 
common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense
One of the mam purposes of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which preceded the draft 
Amsterdam Treaty was to make the CFSP more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in 
international politics This stemmed from the broad agreement that during its first three years the CFSP 
had not lived up to expectations (Cameron 1999 60) The final Amsterdam Treaty made important changes 
to the CFSP such as the reduction of unanimity voting and the creation of the new post of High 
Representative (HR) These amendments have certainly improved some of the problems plaguing the
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CFSP but others persist I shall discuss the CFSP in its current form throughout this section to explain why 
it does not constitute a unified foreign policy
2) The Agents of the CFSP
The Member States
The fifteen member states of the EU are obviously key actors within the CFSP This is more the case than 
in other areas of EU policy making like trade policy because the CFSP remains largely at the 
intergovernmental level The Commission (the supranational EU institution) has little CFSP authority The 
EU member states are Austria, Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy 
Luxembourg the Netherlands Portugal Spam Sweden and the United Kingdom The members have 
undertaken to support the CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity (Article 11) Each member can 
lay before the Council any foreign and security policy issue and submit proposals to it Member states 
ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions (an instrument I shall discuss later) and 
they defend these common positions m the international forum Under Article 11 of the TEU members 
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations
The European Council
The EU members formulate the CFSP largely by operating through intergovernmental institutions The 
most important institution in this regard is the European Council It is composed of Heads of State and 
Government and the Commission President who meet at least once every six months The European 
Council has the responsibility for setting the guidelines for the CFSP and its decisions are important both 
substantively and for the catalytic effect they have on the policy process While the European Council is the 
most authoritative EU institution it rarely has the time to engage in detailed debate on foreign policy Such 
debate generally occurs in the General Affairs Council (GAC) which is the main CFSP decision making 
body The GAC meets monthly and considers policy options addresses and resolves disagreements and 
issues foreign policy statements and initiatives
The Council of the European Union (the Council)
The European Council is distinct from and easily confused with the Council of the European Union 
which was formerly known as the Council of Ministers and is usually referred to simply as the Council 
The Council is composed of ministerial representatives from each member state For CFSP matters the 
Council comprises Foreign Affairs Ministers who meet in the GAC The Council through the GAC has to 
take decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of the CFSP on the basis of the general 
guidelines which the European Council lays down The Council works with the Commission to ensure that 
there is consistency across the EU pillar structure
Bodies Responsible for GAC Proceedings
The GAC proceedings are prepared by both the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the 
Political Committee (PoCo) and at a lower level working parties Coreper has overall responsibility for 
preparing the work of the Council in all its compositions This means that all items submitted to the 
Council must previously have been placed on the agenda of Coreper PoCo is composed of the Political 
Directors of member states and the Commission Its mam tasks include monitoring the international 
situation in CFSP areas contributing to the definition of policies and monitoring the implementation of 
agreed policies CFSP working parties are composed of experts from EU member states and the 
Commission They meet to elaborate policy documents and options for the consideration of the PoCo
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The Presidency
Every six months a member state takes the combined Presidency of the European Council the Council 
Coreper PoCo and the working parties The Presidency is responsible for the implementation of CFSP 
decisions and represents the EU in CFSP matters It expresses the position of the EU in international 
organizations and at international conferences At the moment the Presidency is held by France in 2001 it 
will be held first by Sweden and then by Belgium
The regularity with which the Presidency changes has been a source of criticism First the Presidency is not 
easily identifiable as a visible and continuous actor on the international scene Second each Presidency 
tries to make its mark within its six month term in fields of national importance which creates a focus on 
short term results and erratic changes of emphasis (Kudlich 1998) On the other hand the frequency of the 
change m Presidency has been praised for ensuring a regular injection of new political will (Ricketts 1998) 
It also bolsters the popular legitimacy of the EU because each country regardless of size is given a turn at 
the helm
The High Representative
The Presidency is assisted m its tasks by the new post of High Representative (HR) created by the 
Amsterdam Treaty The High Representative is the Secretary-General of the Council According to Article 
18 the HR will assist the Presidency in the external representation of the EU and in the implementation of 
decisions in CFSP matters The HR also has the task of assisting the Council in particular through 
contributing to the formulation preparation and implementation of policy decisions and when 
appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency through conducting 
political dialogue with third countries (Article 26) The HR is placed under the authority of the EU s 
foreign ministers and the Presidency m particular The former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana is 
the first person to hold the position of HR
The HR post was created to give more continuity from one Presidency to another and to give a face to the 
CFSP It was hoped that it might respond to the well known question posed by Henry Kissinger Whom 
do I call when I want to speak to Europe9 However this prospect is unlikely considering that it is the 
Presidency not the HR which actually represents the EU in matters concerning CFSP The authority 
which the HR exercises will depend largely upon how the rotating Presidency interprets the HR s ability to 
assist As Simon Duke points out it is difficult to imagine the HR having significant sway in one of the 
presidencies of the major members (Duke 1999 8)
The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
The HR is aided in his or her task by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit which was also 
established by the Amsterdam Treaty The PPEWU s mandate includes monitoring analysis and 
assessment of international developments and events including early warning on potential crises It also 
includes drafting upon Council request or on its own initiative of policy options which may contain 
recommendations and strategies for presentation to the Council The PPEWU provides a response to the 
question asked by John Peterson how could the EU ever have a common foreign policy without a 
common planning and analysis capability9 (Peterson 1998 9) In this way it is an important institutional 
step forward for the EU It provides the EU with another means by which to bring together its member state 
interests
The Commission
The Commission unlike the European Council or the Council is a supranational EU institution Its twenty 
Commissioners-two each from France Germany Italy Spain and the United Kingdom and one from each
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of the other member states act in the Union s interest independently of the national governments that 
nominated them In the EU s first pillar the Commission is a central actor It is not central in Pillar II 
though because member states have been adamant about keeping the CFSP at the intergovernmental as 
opposed to the supranational level
The Commission is fully associated with the work of the CFSP (Article 27) and in many ways acts like a 
sixteenth member state Like any member it may refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and 
request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting The Commission also works with the 
Council to ensure overall consistency of EU external activities as a whole
The Commission upset about its estrangement from foreign policy making sought to obtain a more 
important role in the Amsterdam Treaty However no important concessions were made to it as the Treaty 
fortified the preeminence of the Council over EU foreign policy making This served to emphasize the 
already tense relationship between the Commission and the Council This tension is an institutionally based 
reflection of the two cultures of the EU mtergovemmentalism and supranationalem (Allen 1998a, 42) 
The move to supranational ism will only come when the member states provide the political will As the 
Amsterdam Treaty illustrated the Commission s own desire to have a heightened role is virtually 
meaningless
3) CFSP Instruments
There is a wide range of instruments available to the EU in the implementation of the CFSP The 
Amsterdam Treaty added two new instruments common strategies and international agreements to the 
instruments already provided for in the TEU (common positions joint actions and declarations) The CFSP 
instruments are roughly outlined in Article 12
Common Positions
The purpose of a common position is to define the approach of the Union to a particular matter and to make 
cooperation between the member states more systematic (Article 15) The Council can adopt a common 
position to set out the Union s position on particular geographical or topical issues The members then 
ensure that their national policies are in line with the common position and they support it at international 
conferences and within international organizations As a result of this instrument member states are 
increasingly aligning their voting strategies internationally A common European voice has become a 
decisive factor within the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE)
Joint Actions
The Council adopts joint actions in certain situations requiring operational action by the EU Joint actions 
enable member states and the EC to commit material and financial resources within the framework of a 
concerted action The joint action is a legal instrument which is binding on the EU states and may only be 
deviated from under special circumstances It differs from a common position because it forms a basis for a 
common Union approach at the international level rather than simply setting the ground plan for member 
states national foreign policies (European Commission 1999) Examples of joint actions include 
monitoring elections and supporting democracy in Russia and South Africa supporting the Middle East 
Peace Process and lobbying for the extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Cameron 1999 43)
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Common Strategies
The common strategy is a new instrument available to EU foreign policy makers Its purpose is to enhance 
the coherence of the EU s external action through a systematic inter pillar approach To do this common 
strategies call into play the instruments of the EC (for example trade policy and technical and financial 
assistance) the CFSP and the third pillar-Justice and Home Affairs The European Council decides 
common strategies in areas where the member states have important interests Each strategy specifies its 
objectives its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the members 
individually
The Conclusion of International Agreements
Where an agreement needs to be concluded with one or more states or international organizations in the 
international sphere the Council may authorize the Presidency to enter into negotiations The Commission 
during such negotiations would assist the Presidency as necessary The Council acting unanimously on a 
recommendation from the Presidency would then conclude the agreements It should be noted that no 
international agreement is binding on a member state that has to comply with the requirements of its own 
constitution The other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply to them 
provisionally
Declarations
Declarations give public expression to a position request or expectation of the EU vis à vis a third country 
or an international issue This flexible instrument makes it possible to react very quickly to sudden 
incidents in a particular part of the world and to state the EU s point of view There is no provision for 
declarations in Title V of the TEU but they were a feature of EPC which are still frequently used under 
CFSP (Cameron 1999 142)
These five instruments do not attract much controversy Their overarching purpose is to encourage as much 
cooperation as possible between the member states and to provide the EU with as much unity as the current 
level of political will allows The decision making procedures used are more controversial
4) Decision Making Procedures
Generally speaking decision making on CFSP matters requires a unanimous vote The criticized outcome 
of this is the lowest common denominator whereby the wishes of the most conservative country closest 
to the status quo prevails There are however three circumstances where the unanimity rule is abandoned 
and qualified majority voting (QMV) is used First any instruments being used to implement a common 
strategy are decided by a qualified majority of the Council The common strategies themselves are adopted 
unanimously by the European Council Second joint actions and common positions which do not form the 
basis of a common strategy are also decided using QMV Third since the Nice Summit of December 2000 
QMV is also used to appoint the High Representative (Conference of Member States 2000) A qualified 
majority requires sixty two Council votes in favor (out of eighty seven) cast by at least ten members 
(McCormick 1999 131)
The scope for QMV is restricted by the fact that no such vote will be taken if a member state declares that 
for important reasons of national policy it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by 
qualified majority In such a situation the Council can acting by a qualified majority request that the 
matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity Furthermore QMV does not apply 
to decisions with military implications
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Following the Amsterdam Treaty a new mechanism has been introduced known as constructive 
abstention to dilute the inefficiencies surrounding the unanimity rule Constructive abstention allows a 
decision to proceed when not all the EU members want to be involved If member states abstain they are 
not obliged to apply the EU decision but they must accept in a spirit of solidarity that the decision 
commits the Union as a whole and they must not adopt any national policy that might conflict with the 
Union s decision The constructive abstention mechanism will not apply if the members abstaining account 
for more than one third of the Council votes 
I
Constructive abstention has been criticized by Europeamsts for entrenching the intergovernmental nature of 
the CFSP because it allows EU members to act for reasons of national rather than European interest 
(Walker 1999) Nevertheless it also allows more decisions to proceed at the EU level which encourages 
member states to identify with broader European interests As Stavridis argues diverging national interests 
have to be considered not as an impediment for the emergence of a common European international stance 
but instead as the starting point from which such a development might occur (Stavridis 1997 89)
1 II The CFSP Not a Unified Foreign Policy
At this stage the CFSP clearly does not fulfill the requirements of a unified foreign policy Its problems lie 
not so much with the formulation of a single policy position although this could be improved by further 
reducing the use of unanimity voting Rather the biggest flaw of the CFSP is the absence of a single body 
able to state the EU s policy position authoritatively
A Single Policy Position7
The CFSP certainly goes some way toward providing a single EU position to be directed to the world 
Through the common positions joint actions common strategies and other CFSP instruments the EU 
generally produces a policy response to issues falling within its scope Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty when 
there were more rigid rules on unanimity voting this common position often reflected the lowest common 
denominator of the member states and subsequently dissatisfied many of the EU members and also made 
agreement difficult With the new rules governing QMV and constructive abstention however the CFSP 
produces a better compromise of the fifteen varying positions Furthermore the path leading to this single 
position is faster and more efficient because the blockages associated with unanimous voting have been 
eradicated Nevertheless the general rule of unanimity voting remains especially in the context of 
decisions with military or defense implications where QMV cannot be used Although unanimity voting 
does not usually prevent the formulation of a single policy position the resulting position is more 
representative and easier to reach when QMV is used
Unlike EU trade policy which I shall discuss in some detail next the CFSP does not require the member 
states to abandon their national foreign policies Instead it runs alongside them In this way it is 
intergovernmental not supranational Although this may seem contrary to the idea of a single policy 
position the member states are required to keep their national policies in line with the EU one Thus 
mtergovernmentalism does not in itself pose a hindrance to a single policy position Nevertheless if the 
use of QMV were extended it would be easier to reach single policy positions The issue of broadening the 
use of QMV is one which came under scrutiny at the December 2000 Nice Summit Other than extending 
the use of QMV to the appointment of the High Representative no changes were made in the realm of 
CFSP This was a disappointing outcome for those hoping to see the EU work towards a more unified 
foreign policy position Despite this setback the extension of QMV remains an important issue of EU 
reform and it will undoubtedly be revisited at the next EU summit
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An Authoritative Foreign Policy Representative?
The CFSP s biggest weakness is that it lacks a representative which authoritatively asserts its position in 
the way that a government does for a state This task is fulfilled by the Commission in the realm of trade 
Under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) the Commission has been given exclusive competence in 
trade It negotiates tariff levels with third parties and it articulates the Community position externally The 
CCP has replaced national trade policies (Soetendorp 1999 82) Should an outsider want to know the EU s 
stance on a particular trade issue the Commission provides the answer Because of the sensitive political 
nature of the issues coming within the CFSP s scope the EU member states have been unwilling to cede 
nearly as much of their competence to the Commission in CFSP as they have in trade policy Instead the 
CFSP s various agents speak for the EU at different times The end result is that the EU still lacks a focal 
point and a leadership capable of acting authoritatively (Allen 1998a, 42)
According to the TEU the Presidency represents the EU in matters coming within the CFSP (Article 18) 
However the Presidency fails as an authoritative representative of the CFSP for several reasons First 
because it consists of just one country it cannot claim to represent EU interests like the Commission can in 
the realm of trade policy Each Presidency tends to push its national interests because it has such a short 
tenure with so much time between offices For this reason the Presidency cannot enter into negotiations 
without Council authorization nor make any meaningful commitments on the EU s behalf Second 
because it changes every six months it lacks the continuity and external familiarity required of a CFSP 
representative As soon as a Presidency begins to be recognized internationally it changes office Third 
within the CFSP s institutional structure authority has been granted to various other bodies and figures 
too This creates a confusion of representation which detracts from the Presidency s voice
The CFSP s Multiple Voices
In addition to the Presidency there are four other voices representing the EU in CFSP matters These voices 
make the task of attaining an EU policy position more difficult because they compete with the Presidency s 
representation weak as it is First there is the post of HR required to act on behalf of the Council to 
conduct political dialogue with third parties (Article 26) The HR was created in order to give the CFSP a 
face and voice Although it does play an important role in giving the CFSP an identity particularly when 
held by a prominent political figure like Javier Solana it also adds more confusion to CFSP representation
Second a new breed of special envoys appointed either by the Council or the Presidency since the late 
1990s are articulating the EU s voice These envoys have represented the EU in places such as the Middle 
East Bosnia, Central Africa and Cyprus Third although it has no formal role in the CFSP s representation 
the Commission has 127 delegations around the world operating under its external relation s authority 
These delegations play an important role in representing the broader EU position overseas Because the 
Council does not have any diplomatic service outsiders sometimes mistakenly believe that the Commission 
delegations represent the CFSP Last because there is not a single EU voice outside countries will often 
contact one or more of the member states in an effort to ascertain the European position Although members 
are expected to tow the CFSP line one purpose of the CFSP is to eradicate the need to contact fifteen 
different governments
The absence of a single authoritative voice is the most glaring way in which the CFSP differs from the 
foreign policy of a state Each state has a central government which represents its foreign policy position 
In the EU different actors represent the CFSP at different times Despite attempts to correct this there is 
still no meaningful answer to Kissinger s question who do I call when I want to speak to Europe? 
Surrendering national foreign policy to supranationality is not the only way in which a single voice can be 
formulated though This works in the field of trade policy but that does not make it obligatory The EU 
could have a single CFSP representative without becoming supranational Intergovemmentalism does not 
in itself stand in the way of authoritative representation If a single foreign policy position can be
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formulated then so too can a voice to represent it The problem the CFSP faces at the moment is that there 
are too many voices The EU needs to give just one the authority to represent the CFSP on every occasion
Creating a Single Voice
Considering its current role the Presidency would be the most appropriate institution for this position The 
Presidency is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions and it represents the EU in CFSP 
matters The mam problem with the Presidency at this stage is that it changes every six months and it is 
held by only one member at a time which means that it is not an easily recognizable player internationally 
nor is it representative of the fifteen EU members The EU foreign policy representative should have longer 
tenure and be less nationally oriented Ben Hall has proposed a remedy that suggests
The tidiest solution would be for the member states to divide into four teams The teams would take it in 
turns to run presidencies lasting two and a half years thus coinciding neatly with the terms of the 
Commission and European Parliament The member states in the presidency team would share out 
responsibility for policy areas at the beginning of each 30 month term (Hall 2000b)
Considering that there are fifteen EU Members perhaps three teams with a longer term would be even 
tidier Whatever the specific situation if the member states could cooperate within presidencies instead of 
having a term each this would help produce the continuity required of a foreign policy representative and it 
would also take the national focus away from the Presidency thereby making it more representative 
Although not all the fifteen members would have control at any one time it must be remembered that for 
the most part the Presidency would be representing a previously decided policy rather than making 
decisions directly Of course there would be times when the Presidency would have to make commitments 
on the EU s behalf but it would receive guidance from the Council about important matters
Because all EU nations need to be involved decision making authority should not be transferred to the 
Presidency The decision making authority that rests with the European Council and the Council already 
generally produces a single foreign policy position However the Presidency should be responsible for 
representing this position in every forum Accordingly the post of HR should be dissolved It simply adds 
confusion and an extra voice to the CFSP
The changes I have proposed are feasible They do not require a move to supranational^ nor do they 
suggest the creation of costly new institutions They are well within the realm of changes the EU has 
approved in previous years Nevertheless they are unlikely to emerge within the next few years The EU 
has not unveiled any concrete plans to make the proposed changes The only reason for optimism is that the 
EU member states regularly express the desire to form a single voice However translating this political 
will into reality is not easy Institutional reform of this nature was not discussed at the Nice Summit and it 
will probably not be addressed until other more pressing issues such as enlargement are taken care of
III Is the EU Developing a Unified Foreign Policy9
To develop a unified foreign policy the EU does not need to create any new posts or bodies More 
importantly it does not need to adopt supranational decision making in the realm of CFSP I disagree with 
Waltz s assertion that the EU needs to become a single state to become a great power (Waltz 1993 52) 
Sufficient unity can be achieved through intergovernmental means As Tony Blair recently stated the EU 
can be a superpower but not a superstate (Blair 2000) To develop a unified foreign policy the EU 
simply needs further cooperation and a refinement of its existing institutions Although the CFSP currently 
produces a single policy position this position would be more representative and more easily formulated if 
the use of QMV was extended particularly to decisions with military implications This seems likely to 
occur as it is high on the EU s agenda However more important is the reform needed to create a single 
voice to represent the CFSP At this stage the EU has not unveiled any specific plans for improving the
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CFSP in this way However the EU is keen to be a bigger actor on the international scene It is aware that a 
single voice is a prerequisite to meeting this goal On many occasions the member states have expressed a 
willingness to cooperate to formulate a single voice As long as this political will exists the prospects for a 
unified foreign policy are good One potential barrier to such political will is EU enlargement the impact of 
which I shall discuss now
The Impact of Enlargement
The issue of enlargement is an important one because it could produce more heterogeneity and less 
cohesiveness in the EU The EU s accession negotiations with third countries are taking place in two 
waves The first wave of negotiation began in 1998 with six countries Cyprus the Czech republic 
Estonia, Hungary Poland and Slovenia These negotiations will be followed by a second wave of five 
countries Bulgaria, Latvia Lithuania Romania and Slovakia In addition to these eleven candidates there 
are two more Malta and Turkey Malta reactivated its application for membership in September 1998 and 
it will join the second wave of negotiations At the Helsinki Summit it was agreed that Turkey would be 
offered candidate status but that negotiations would begin only after it overcame EU concerns over its 
human rights record In theory the second wave group could overtake the first wave to gain membership 
Cyprus and Malta are considered the best positioned to join (Sutherland 2000) There has been no date set 
for the first enlargement Some estimates suggest 2003 but any time prior to 2005 is unlikely The EU has 
refrained from providing an exact date
In order to qualify for membership in the Union applicant states must satisfy a series of strict economic 
and political conditions First they must fulfill the conditions of European identity democratic status and 
respect for human rights Second they must accept the Community system and have the capacity to 
implement it and third they must accept and have the ability to implement the CFSP as it evolves over 
the coming years (Presidency of the European Union 1999a Sjursen 1997 162)
Enlargement could disrupt the progression towards a unified foreign policy by introducing more diverse 
interests into the EU thereby making cooperation more difficult Although unanimity voting has been 
relaxed in several areas and will likely be relaxed further at this stage it remains the guiding principle of 
CFSP voting This causes enough problems when there are fifteen members with twenty eight the lowest 
common denominator could become even lower On the other hand this new diversity of interests might 
prompt important EU reform With almost double the national interests to consider the EU could not 
simply expect the current system to continue working smoothly Voting procedures would probably have to 
be relaxed even further and the rotating Presidency would certainly be assessed Under the current system 
if there were twenty eight members each country would be President every fourteen years instead of every 
seven This would certainly encourage countries to team up Enlargement might therefore help produce 
the unified foreign policy that the CFSP lacks at this point in time Of course this will not just eventuate 
via institutional reform The political will for a unified foreign policy must also be present But considering 
the stringent criteria the candidates must meet before accession will be granted getting them to see things 
the EU way might not be so difficult
Conclusion
The EU does not yet possess a unified foreign policy Its biggest problem lies not in the formulation of a 
single policy position-although this would be more representative and easier to formulate if the rules 
surrounding unanimity voting were relaxed further-but in the absence of an authoritative representative 
The Presidency which has been given the responsibility of external representation lacks the continuity and 
broad EU representation that such a task requires To change the EU does not need to become a state it 
does not even need to make the transition from mtergovernmentalism to supranationallty What it must do 
is reform the Presidency to give it a more effective voice and eliminate all other competing voices
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If the EU member states teamed up in a few groups and worked together for several years in each 
Presidency the Presidency would have far more significance on the international stage Outsiders could 
keep track of it and form stronger links The problem of each country trying to push its short term agenda 
would be alleviated and the Presidency would represent EU interests more broadly
Whether all of these necessary changes will eventuate is difficult to determine The use of QMV will 
almost certainly be extended although little progress was made at the Nice Summit I am also optimistic 
about the proposed reform of the Presidency which would create a single foreign policy representative 
because it does not ask too much of the member states They can retain their national foreign policies and 
an intergovernmental system They do not need to become a single state However such change will 
probably be a long time coming Enlargement of the EU would not necessarily cause disruption to the 
process of developing a unified foreign policy It may in fact serve as a catalyst for EU reform Although 
there is no decisive response to the question of whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy I 
believe that the answer is yes but it will take time It may not happen within the next few years but it 
could well occur before the decade ends
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Chapter 5
IS THE EU DEVELOPING A REQUISITE MILITARY CAPABILITY’
The fifth criterion for determining whether an actor is a great power is the presence of military strength 
Obviously all countries possess some military strength Even a small population can provide this But for a 
great power the standard is higher How much military strength is actually required of a great power 
depends upon three factors how it scores in the other areas of great power whether it possesses nuclear 
weapons and finally what security threats it needs to respond to These are factors I outlined in Chapter 3 
My conclusions were that because the EU rates so well in the other areas of great power particularly 
economic strength it need not excel in military strength Since the EU possesses nuclear deterrence (a point 
I will discuss in further detail in this chapter) it does not require a large conventional force It only needs a 
conventional force big enough to act as a trip wire and to protect its interests and support its diplomacy 
in wider Europe
In this chapter I will address the question of whether the EU is developing this requisite military strength I 
first explain why the EU possesses nuclear deterrence because this shapes the conventional force required 
of the EU Following on from this I will adopt the same structure I used for Chapter 4 In the second 
section I will explain why the EU does not have a requisite military capability at this point in time All 
previous attempts at forming a defense capability outlined in Chapter 1 have failed In the third section I 
shall examine the prospects for the eventual development of an EU military capability via the proposed 
rapid reaction force (RRF)
I A Nuclear European Union’
At this stage the EU does not have its own nuclear force But two of its Member States France and the 
United Kingdom do possess nuclear weapons Whether or not either or both of these nations would be 
willing to supply the EU with their weapons and whether the EU would be willing to accept them are 
difficult questions to address My argument in this section however is that regardless of whether or not 
there is a formal surrendering of nuclear force from the national to the EU level EU nuclear deterrence 
exists anyway
An EU Nuclear Capability’
The EU does not have its own independent nuclear capability at this point in time Since the early 1990s 
there has been a strong push by the French towards an EU nuclear force On 10 January 1992 President 
François Mitterand unexpectedly raised the issue of a common European nuclear doctrine stating that it 
would quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defense 
(Tertrais 1999 56) Later in September 1997 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin confirmed that France wants to 
deepen the dialogue with its main partners on the whole range of questions pertaining to deterrence 
(Tertrais 1999 56)
France has made it clear that it does not wish to replace the NATO deterrent but that it would like it to 
have a specifically European dimension As one of the only two EU countries with a nuclear force France 
is in a position to be a decisive player in this field The British position has been more conservative than the 
French position The British have signaled some willingness to form a common deterrent but they are more 
cautious about disrupting Atlantic ties
The willingness of the two nuclear countries to donate their forces is not the only relevant issue in the 
calculation of an EU nuclear capability The remaining thirteen countries must also be willing to accept the 
nuclear force on offer There is a spectrum of attitudes within the EU towards the idea of a common nuclear
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force At one end lie the Southern European countries like Spain and Italy which have been receptive to 
the concept particularly to the idea that the vital interests of European countries are increasingly 
intertwined Germany closer to the center has taken a similar stance to Britain It would be happy to see an 
EU capability develop so long as it complements and reinforces the US commitment At the other end of 
the spectrum lie the Northern European countries where strong anti nuclear sentiment is combined with 
reluctance to develop a common European defense dimension These countries along with Ireland have 
most adamantly opposed cooperation on nuclear issues
Overcoming such sensitivities would be the biggest hurdle for a European nuclear capability particularly in 
light of the fact that the EU does not at the moment face a unifying threat Nevertheless it is my contention 
that the EU possesses nuclear deterrence despite the absence of a formal EU nuclear capability a point I 
explain below Therefore the EU does not need to overcome the problem of differing national attitudes 
towards a unified nuclear force French and British nuclear deterrence is sufficient
Nuclear Deterrence in the EU
Eleven of the EU Member States are also members of NATO as such they are covered by United States 
extended deterrence (Yost 1999 9) In this thesis however my focus is upon the capabilities of the EU as 
an independent entity While NATO deterrence may impact upon the EU this is unimportant in the 
calculation of EU military strength In assessing the independent capabilities of a state or an actor like the 
EU I cannot take into account the promises provided by an alliance like NATO The EU could only be 
considered a great power if it could continue to function if NATO fell apart If it relies upon NATO nuclear 
deterrence then this would not be the case Therefore despite the fact that most of the EU countries are 
provided with deterrence via NATO in this thesis I do not regard this as EU deterrence
The nuclear forces of Britain and France are not particularly sizable compared to those of the United States 
and Russia Both countries nuclear arsenals have been significantly reduced in the 1990s Britain has the 
distinction of being the world s first nuclear state to rely exclusively on a submarine based nuclear force 
However this does not affect the deterrent capability of these forces since as Bernard Brodie explains 
nuclear weapons forces do not have to fight there like (Brodie 1973 321) A relatively small even 
submarine based nuclear force can still provide a second strike As long as this second strike capability 
exists which it does deterrence is created because retaliation is possible
Because of the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons they prompt caution in any would be 
aggressors This is what the logic of nuclear deterrence rests upon Because of the integration that has 
occurred in Europe thus far any power contemplating an attack upon any of the thirteen non nuclear EU 
countries would be unsure of whether Britain or France would respond with nuclear force This doubt 
would deter a potential aggressor from attacking While this deterrence might not be as potent as that which 
exists for a nuclear country itself it still allows the EU to operate with a smaller conventional force than it 
would otherwise need For this reason the standard of military strength I outlined in Chapter 3 (a 
conventional force big enough to act as a trip wire and to protect the EU s interests and support its 
diplomacy in wider Europe) would be enough to elevate the EU to great power status
II The Current Absence of a Requisite Military Capability
At this stage the EU does not have the military capability of a great power In fact it does not have an 
independent unified military capability at all The defense of the EU members is currently taken care of by 
the individual members via national defense forces by NATO under the collective defense guarantee 
outlined in the Washington Treaty (excluding Austria Finland Ireland and Sweden) and by the Western 
European Union (WEU) for the ten EU countries that constitute its full membership Previous attempts at 
forming a defense capability outlined in Chapter 1 have not come to fruition The bulk of this chapter 
therefore will examine the prospects for an EU defense capability
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III Is the EU Developing a Requisite Defense Capability9
In December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council the EU laid down concrete plans to establish a 
defense capability of 50 000-60 000 troops by 2003 In this section I shall concentrate on two questions in 
order to determine whether the EU is developing a requisite military capability First what is the precise 
nature of the 1999 plans9 And second if they eventuate would they constitute a great power defense 
capability9
1) What is the Precise Nature of the 1999 Plans9
In December 1999 at its Helsinki Summit the European Council signaled its determination to launch and 
conduct EU led military operations in response to international crises It decided that Member States 
must be able by 2003 to deploy within sixty days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 
50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks (Presidency of the European Union 
1999c) The Petersberg Tasks which were first created by the WEU and have since been codified in the 
TEU consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking (Article 17 Para 2) The establishment of this proposed rapid 
reaction force (RRF) also referred to as the Helsinki headline goal raises some important issues I shall 
address each of these in turn in order to explain the current status of the 1999 plans
The Role the Rapid Reaction Force Is Expected to Play
According to the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions the purpose of the RRF is to give the 
EU means where NATO as a whole is not engaged to respond to international crises in support of the 
CFSP (Presidency of the European Union 1999c Para 27 and Annex 1) The Feira European Council 
Presidency Conclusions of June 2000 affirm this statement and add that the EU should be provided with all 
the necessary means and capabilities to play its full role on the international stage (Presidency of the 
European Union 2000b Annex 1 Para 1)
As the French Presidency explained in an address before the WEU Assembly the Petersberg Tasks are 
humanitarian missions or the evacuation of nationals missions for the maintenance of peace combat 
missions for the handling of crises including military operations for the reestablishment of peace 
(Masseret 2000) On several occasions the EU has stated that the headline goal is not an attempt to create 
EU collective security Collective security forms part of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and the EU has been 
cautious about superseding NATO s role
The EU wants to achieve its headline goal so that it is not so reliant upon NATO when situations like the 
one in Kosovo arise Since the end of the Cold War the EU has increasingly faced the threat of instability 
caused by territorial and ethnic conflicts to its east Although the threat of attack is always a possibility for 
any country at any time the biggest threat for the EU at this stage simply comes from the instability caused 
by these neighboring disputes As the Presidency Report explained crisis management is the area where a 
European capacity to act is required most urgently (Presidency of the European Union 1999b) The EU is 
aware that such disputes will not necessarily be so significant to the United States which may decide not to 
intervene The EU must therefore have the independent capability to protect its interests
The Capabilities of the Rapid Reaction Force
The operational side of the RRF calls for between 50 000 and 60 000 troops which will require a pool of 
over 100 000 troops to enable rotation According to the EU these forces are part of a complete military 
logic since they are to be militarily self sufficient and endowed with the necessary capacities of command 
control and intelligence logistics combat support units as well as if necessary air force and naval 
elements (Masseret 2000 Presidency of the European Union 1999c) The force must have the capacity to
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collect intelligence analyze situations plan and carry out military operations constitute an adequate 
volume of military forces deliver high intensity combat and implement interoperability at all levels
The RRF will also have a decision making mechanism which will work within the CFSP Three new 
permanent bodies will be established within the Council First there will be a Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives at the senior ambassadorial level The PSC will 
deal with all aspects of the CFSP in accordance with the TEU In the case of a military crisis management 
operation the PSC will exercise under the authority of the Council the political control and strategic 
direction of the operation (Presidency of the European Union 2000a) The second decision making body 
will be the Military Committee (MC) which will be composed of the Chiefs of Defense represented by 
their military delegates This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC 
Third will be the Military Staff (MS) which is to be established within the Council structures to provide 
military expertise and support to the security and defense aspects of the CFSP It will receive direction 
from the MC These three bodies were established as an interim decision making structure on 1 March 
2000 and will become permanent early next year
Member State Contributions
The headline goal is an outcome of Member State cooperation in the European Council All of the fifteen 
states are entitled to participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU force How much each state decides 
to commit to both the force and individual operations is entirely based upon its sovereign decision The 
resources which are committed remain under national control They do not become EU property and 
therefore the RRF does not constitute an EU army When military operations are carried out an ad hoc 
committee of contributors will be set up While all EU members are entitled to attend the committee only 
contributing states will take part in the actual conduct of the operation (Ojanen Herolf and Lindahl 2000 
66)
On the 20 November 2000 the Defense Ministers of the EU Member States met at the Capabilities 
Commitment Conference to decide upon how much each country would commit to the RRF The final 
contributions set out in a Force Catalogue constituted a pool of more than 100 000 troops 400 combat 
aircraft and 100 vessels (General Affairs Council 2000) The largest contributor is Germany which has 
pledged 13 500 troops while the UK pledged 12 500 and France followed with 12 000 (Lewis 2000) The 
only country which declined to take any part in the commitment of resources was Denmark Of interest 
was the fact that all the neutral or non aligned EU countries namely Austria Finland Ireland and Sweden 
pledged resources There had been some concern trom various sources that these countries would prove to 
be a problem for the development of an EU defense dimension (Gourlay and Remade 1998 64) This 
concern can now be put aside
Although these contributions bode well for the RRF the EU countries are deficient in some key areas 
which they will need to address to reach the 2003 goal Capability gaps include command and control of 
forces all weather intelligence systems targeting and evaluation of damage cruise missiles all weather 
strike capability suppression of air defense systems and logistical support (Mackenzie 2000) French 
Defense Minister Alain Richard suggests that intelligence would be the most difficult bridge to gap 
Although efforts are being made to correct this situation—Italy Germany and France for example have 
put some new generation satellites at the RRF s disposal—it will take considerable effort to ensure 
interoperability (Mackenzie 2000)
This problem of a capability gap would be addressed it the EU had access to NATO resources Whether or 
not this access will be provided is an issue currently being assessed in NATO and one which I address later 
in this thesis Nevertheless the EU at this stage is aiming towards developing sufficient resources to carry 
out the Petersburg Tasks independently so that NATO does not tie its hands
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The Role of the Western European Union
The WEU is a military alliance that was set up in 1948 by the UK France Italy and the Benelux countries 
for the purposes of cooperation on defense and security Today the WEU has ten members (all the EU 
countries except Austria Denmark Finland Ireland and Sweden) Under Article V of the WEU Brussels 
Treaty the full members have a collective defense guarantee The WEU has no forces or standing 
command structure of its own Its Member States makes military units available to it on a case by case 
basis Up until recently the WEU has played an important role as the EU s defense arm despite the 
difference in EU and WEU memberships This is evidenced by Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty which 
describes the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an 
operational capability
Developments in the implementation of the headline goal have severely reduced the WEU s role in 
European security affairs One of the WEU s most important roles working to carry out the Petersberg 
Tasks has been completely transferred to the EU since the Marseille Ministerial Council of 13 November 
2000 (WEU Ministerial Council 2000) In addition the WEU will no longer continue its routine 
consultations with NATO or its dialogue and cooperation with any third countries These too are 
responsibilities the EU will take up (WEU Ministerial Council 2000) However the WEU will retain 
residual structures and functions including the collective defense commitment of the 1954 Brussels Treaty
The Role of NATO
NATO s main rationale lies in the collective defense it offers under Article V of the Washington Treaty 
The main rationale of the RRF on the other hand lies in crisis management Although NATO has 
undertaken crisis management (Kosovo is an example) the EU has concerns that situations may arise 
where NATO (or more specifically the United States) does not want to be involved For this reason the EU 
wants its own force so that it can act if NATO does not The EU has been very cautious about undermining 
the role of NATO through the new force For this reason it has stressed that the force does not offer 
collective security—this remains NATO s domain
The plans to develop the RRF have created divisions within NATO which center around how much 
autonomy the RRF should have There are those countries that would like to see the RRF develop 
essentially as part of NATO—drawing upon NATO assets and capabilities and using NATO planning 
structures The United States is the strongest advocate of this position because it fears that if the EU 
becomes too independent militarily and begins to duplicate NATO s resources the United States may be 
left out of European security affairs and lose influence in the region The United States supports the EU s 
efforts to shoulder more responsibility in the realm of defense but it does not want the EU to go too far As 
U S Secretary of Defense William Cohen commented at a recent Press Conference there is the need to 
support the creation of this EU rapid reaction capability provided that it is not seen as being in competition 
with NATO itself we should not have dual planning institutions (Cohen 2000b 2) Other EU countries 
such as Britain Germany and the Netherlands have also supported a RRF with close NATO ties although 
they have signaled some willingness to develop an independent EU planning structure On the other side of 
the debate lies France who wants to see the RRF develop completely independent capabilities including 
planning structures This is not surprising considering France s longstanding desire for greater European 
independence from the United States
At a recent NATO Ministerial Meeting the foreign ministers of the NATO countries attempted to sort out 
their differences concerning the RRF The United States was keen to create assured EU access to NATO 
assets and capabilities to discourage the EU from duplicating NATO resources in developing the RRF and 
thereby gaining greater independence Such access to NATO assets met the approval of the EU members 
who still fall short militarily in some key areas Despite French objections it was agreed that access to 
assets would only be permitted if NATO planning structures were utilized If it had not been for the veto 
which Turkey imposed this access would have been approved Turkey who has not been granted EU
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membership refused to allow the EU ensured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities because of 
its serious territorial disputes with Greece (which is an EU member) over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea 
(Hamilton 2000) Turkey said that it would only agree upon EU assured access if it could be included in EU 
decision making—a request that has been flatly rejected by the EU
Turkey s veto has led to an impasse within NATO regarding the EU s RRF The final communiqué of the 
Ministerial Meeting simply asserted that
We intend to put in place arrangements for assured access to NATO planning capabilities able to 
contribute to military planning for EU led operations the presumption of EU availability to the EU of pre 
identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU led operations (Ministerial Meeting 
2000 Para 33)
Clearly all the other eighteen NATO members hope to persuade Turkey to change its veto by the next 
Ministerial Meeting In order to do so they will need to address Turkey s concerns more adequately
Although the EU and NATO have so far failed to agree upon the subject of assured access to assets NATO 
has still developed links to the RRF in other ways First it contributed militaiy and technical advice to the 
EU experts who were working on the catalogue of forces for the Capabilities Commitment Conference 
Second NATO-EU ad hoc working groups have been established to discuss security issues permanent 
arrangements for consultation and cooperation modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities 
and capability goals Finally regular meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the RRF s interim 
Political and Security Committee have been established to enhance the understanding of the two 
institutions and their members on the most effective cooperation In this way the EU is taking over the 
WEU s consultations with NATO
Non coincidence of Membership
One problem the EU faces in the implementation of its headline goal is the non coincidence of membership 
in the EU and NATO The European countries can be divided into four categories for the purpose of this 
analysis First those countries which are members of both NATO and the EU namely Belgium Denmark 
Germany Greece Italy Luxembourg the Netherlands Portugal Spain the UK and France (although 
strictly speaking France is only a halfway member of NATO because it still declines to rejoin its military 
command structure) Second those countries that are members of the EU but not NATO namely Austria, 
Finland Ireland and Sweden Third those countnes which are members of NATO but not the EU namely 
the Czech Republic Hungary Iceland Norway Poland and Turkey Fourth those countries which are 
neither members of the EU nor NATO that is any remaining European countries
The first category is not problematic Countries that are members of both NATO and the EU provide an 
important link between the two organizations The second category of country is not particularly 
problematic either These countries are not involved in any NATO decisions regarding access to assets but 
they will enjoy decision making power within the EU They must simply rely upon their fellow EU 
members to protect EU interests in NATO The third category non EU NATO members is problematic 
The most obvious example of this is Turkey s veto of assured EU access to NATO assets and planning 
capabilities Because Turkey is not involved in LU decision making it does not want the EU to have access 
to NATO capabilities and its veto power in NA TO makes this possible But the EU is determined to 
preserve its decision making autonomy The EU has informed non EU countries in the third and fourth 
categories that they are welcome to donate any íesources to the RRF and they will be consulted about any 
operations but they have no actual power over the decisions made Of course they retain control over their 
own resources Many countries m these categories have already offered resources to the RRF despite their 
lack of decision making power (Lewis 2000)
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2) If The 1999 Plans Eventuate Will They Constitute a Requisite Military Capability7
The prospects of the RRF coming to fruition are good The toughest task getting Member States to commit 
resources to the force has already been accomplished Even the neutral countries traditionally opposed to 
the use of force have pledged troops Although the EU currently suffers from a capability gap it is working 
towards addressing this In addition if the eighteen other NATO members persuade Turkey to remove its 
veto the EU will be assisted by an assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities Although 
tensions between the EU member states on the details of the RRF will undoubtedly arise along the way all 
the EU nations do want to see this force realized As the French Minister for Defense commented
The approach we are following is based on the joint political commitment of the fifteen which is growing 
ever more solid Don t these countries agree on most of the major issues of international politics'? Don t 
they share the same societal values and the same ambitions regarding the political organization of the 
globalized world*? The conditions for their common commitment to the settlement of a crisis are better than 
they have ever been (French Embassy in the United Kingdom 2000c)
The important question then is whether this RRF constitutes the military capability required of the EU to 
elevate it to great power status According to the standard of military strength I established in Chapter 3 
because of the EU s nuclear deterrent and its economic stiength it only needs a conventional force large 
enough both to act as a trip wire and to support its diplomacy and protect its security interests In this 
section I shall determine whether the crisis management force meets this standard
A Trip Wire Conventional Force
A military force serves as a trip wire when any adversary planning an attack would need to create a force 
so big to overcome the target s force that it reveals its aggressive intentions and thereby opens itself to the 
possibility of nuclear attack from its intended victim Even though the intended victim may not use nuclear 
weapons in retaliation the logic of deterrence suggests that no aggressor would be willing to take that risk 
There are no specific ways to measure what constitutes a trip wire force but it is helpful to note that the 
force need only have defensive capabilities A trip wire force is not required to project its power in large 
scale wars It must only be able to pose such an obstacle to aggressors that they would not be able to 
overcome the force before the victim could retaliate with nuclear weapons
The EU s RRF would certainly serve as such an obstacle in an aggressor s calculations In fact the forces 
of the EU countries as they stand now would already constitute such an obstacle Even though they are not 
unified the EU nations have more troops than any individual country These troops are enough to act as a 
trip wire because an outside aggressor would know that the EU could call on them in an emergency The 
added capabilities and assets being developed as a result of the RRF would be useful but they are by no 
means necessary
Protecting Security and Supporting Diplomacy
The second task an EU military needs to be able to fulfill is protection against security threats and support 
of EU diplomatic efforts In Chapter 3 I explained that the threats facing the EU today emanate from the 
east, from intrastate conflict and territorial disputes The most important task of the EU military therefore 
is to stabilize the region through crisis management A military capable enough to perform crisis 
management will also be supporting EU diplomacy which to date has been afflicted by the absence of 
military support
The purpose of the RRF is precisely to meet these security threats in wider Europe and stabilize the region 
The force was formed as a response to EU paralysis over the war in Kosovo Its main task is to manage 
crises such as that one At this stage commitments include 60 000 troops (deployed from a group of over 
100 000) 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels In addition NATO assets may be made available There is
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no reason why the RRF would be unable to protect EU security and support its diplomacy In fact it may 
work further afield than originally expected Some sources have estimated it will be capable to carry out 
operations 4000 kilometers from Europe s shores and take part in UN operations (Lewis 2000 Fitchett 
2000)
Conclusion
Because the EU is served by nuclear deterrence it only needs a conventional force large enough to act as 
trip wire to protect it from security threats and to support its diplomacy The RRF which the EU proposed 
at the Helsinki European Council meets these i equipments If the force eventuates and there is every 
reason to believe that it will it would satisfy the fifth criterion of great power militaiy strength
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CONCLUSION
NEO REALISM EU SECURITY COOPERATION AND GREAT POWER
The goal of this thesis has been to address whether the EU is becoming a great power My analysis so far 
has focused upon empirical considerations In this chapter I turn my attention back to theoretical 
considerations and address two key questions First how well does Neo realism explain EU security and 
defense cooperation'? As I discussed in Chapter 2 most of the literature on EU security cooperation has 
been descriptive or normative rather than theoretical Of the small amount of theoretical literature none 
draws upon Neo realism the dominant framework in security studies In this chapter I fill this gap in the 
literature by assessing Neo realism s utility m the study of EU security affairs My main conclusion is that 
offensive Neo realism fails to explain EU security cooperation but that defensive Neo realism is a 
useful theoretical tool Second how well does Neo realism explain the potential emergence of a non state 
great power*? At this stage Neo realism focuses exclusively upon states as the most important actors in the 
international system In order to make Neo realism progressive Neo realist scholars should be willing to 
broaden this view to encompass non state actors like the EU which may reach great power status in the 
future I begin this chapter by reiterating my analysis and findings from previous chapters I build upon 
these to make this chapter s final conclusions
Previous Chapters Analysis
In Chapter 1 I introduced the thesis question and Waltz s five criteria of great power I also added a sixth 
criterion a unified foreign policy The EU falls short in this sixth criterion and in Waltz s fifth criterion 
military strength For this reason I have sought to determine whether the EU is likely to develop a unified 
foreign policy and the requisite military capability In Chapter 1 I also provided an historical overview of 
the European states attempts at security cooperation and explained the recent momentum towards such 
cooperation
In Chapter 2 I surveyed the literature on EU security cooperation and found that it is more voluminous 
than theoretically rigorous The existing theoretical literature stems almost entirely from the liberal 
tradition Neo realism has been rejected as a theoretical framework because based solely upon the writing 
of Mearsheimer it has been considered inapplicable One reason this thesis is significant is that corrects 
both the dearth of theoretical literature and the neglect of Neo realism within the theoretical literature
In Chapter 3 I examined Neo realist theory more closely dividing it into its offensive and defensive 
variants I particularly focused upon the explanation offered by each variant for state cooperation and the 
role of institutions Offensive Neo realism views power as the most important determinant of international 
politics Security is scarce and states act aggressively The prospects for state cooperation are poor and will 
not be helped by institutions which have no independent causal effect on actors but are simply a reflection 
of their preferences Defensive Neo realism on the other hand views security not power as the main goal 
of states It believes that the prospects for state cooperation are good where states can achieve mutual 
security With the exception of Jervis defensive Neo realists generally view institutions as having little 
causal significance too In Chapter 3 I also set out the methodology adopted in the thesis I have used 
Waltz s criteria for great power as well as my own sixth criterion to ask whether the EU is developing a 
unified foreign policy and the requisite military capability
In Chapter 4 I addressed the question Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy1? At this stage it has a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy but this does not constitute a unified foreign policy In order to make 
the CFSP into a unified foreign policy the EU must extend the exceptions to its unanimity voting principle
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thereby improving the formulation of a single EU policy position It must also provide the CFSP with a 
single voice The most obvious way to do this is to reform the Presidency to give it more continuity and 
authority It is difficult to estimate the prospects of these changes taking place The EU has made no plans 
at this stage to reform the CFSP in these ways Nevertheless the changes I have proposed are not dramatic 
The EU does not need to become a single state and indeed the CFSP can even remain at the 
intergovernmental-as opposed to supranational-level As the CFSP s continuing maladies plague the EU s 
ability to perform it may well decide to make the necessary changes Although a unified foreign policy is 
unlikely to emerge in the next few years we may see one within the next decade
In Chapter 5 I addressed the second empirical question Is the EU developing a military capability9 In the 
EU s case the requisite military capability is not a large conventional force because EU security is 
safeguarded by nuclear deterrence The EU only needs a conventional force large enough to act as a trip 
wire and to support its diplomacy If the EU s 2003 plans for a rapid reaction force come to fruition and 
there is every reason to believe that it will the EU will have such a conventional force A 50 000-60 000 
person force will be able to stabilize wider Europe and give EU diplomacy some teeth Unlike the United 
States the EU s strategic interests are not spread globally they are generally restricted to the European 
continent The EU does not require a military that can project its force worldwide For this reason the rapid 
reaction force would constitute the EU s requisite military capability
My general empirical conclusion is that the EU is unlikely to emerge as a great power in the immediate 
future Its biggest barrier is the absence of a unified foieign policy However if this were to change the EU 
could achieve great power status This has practical significance for international politics because the 
number of great powers affects the polarity of the system As I discussed in Chapter 1 this m turn affects 
the behavior of states and the prospects for peace One need only think of how bipolarity shaped global 
politics from 1945 to 1991 Whether or not a peer competitor will arise to challenge U S global dominance 
is a matter of tremendous importance for 21 century world politics
These issues also have theoretical significance First the cooperation between the EU s sovereign members 
is more extensive than that ever witnessed in the modern state system These countries respond to 
international issues using CFSP rather than national instruments which are increasingly decided by QMV 
they have introduced constructive abstention to pioduce EU responses more easily and most recently they 
have agreed to create a crisis management force To date these steps towards cooperation have not been 
explained by Neo realist theory In fact most of the EU security literature has not drawn upon theory at all 
The small portion which has has largely used liberal theory Below I shall fill this gap in the literature by 
assessing how well Neo realism can explain such cooperation
Second if the EU became a great power it would be the first non state actor to do so Although in many 
ways it would be acting like a state its membeis would retain their sovereignty This is the most important 
distinction between the EU and a state particularly a lederation Each EU member would retain decision 
making authority over its domestic affairs Each member could even have foreign policy autonomy in 
matters relevant only to it If the EU became a great power a non state actor would be joining the rank of 
importance which is currently held only by states 1 o continue to be a useful theory Neo realism must be 
able to accommodate changes such as the rise ot a non state actor like the EU In order to make Neo 
realism progressive it is necessary to relax its insistence on the primacy of states
I How Well Does Neo Realism Explain EU Security and Defense Cooperation7
Never before has security cooperation between states existed to the extent that it now does in the EU More 
and more the EU states are uniting behind one policy position and being represented externally as one 
entity instead of fifteen Such cooperation can be explained by defensive Neo realists but it leaves 
offensive Neo realists puzzled
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Offensive Neo realism What Explanation Does It Offer0
Speaking at a roundtable recently John Mearsheimer admitted that the EU is the toughest case for 
offensive Neo realism He said that the EU s security evolution is an anomaly which offensive Neo 
realism has no answer for The reason for this is that offensive Neo realism considers power maximizing to 
be the main characteristic of state behavior According to Mearsheimer there is no such thing as too much 
power States engage in an endless search for relative powei to try and dominate others The more power a 
state has the less likely it will be dominated For this reason all states have aggressive intentions Though 
states may form alliances to overcome aggressors those alliances will only be temporary Both relative 
gam considerations and concern about cheating inhibit cooperation
From this perspective security cooperation between the EU states is inexplicable On the one hand 
cooperation has given each EU member more power and reduced its chances of domination by another 
which makes sense to an offensive Neo realist But the EU states have started to cede decision making 
authority to the EU level They have willingly entered a situation where their decision making freedom is 
being curtailed by an international institution The new rules allowing QMV and constructive abstention 
illustrate that the EU states are not inhibited by concerns about cheating Regardless of an individual 
member s position on a particular stance it is expected to follow the EU position in a spirit of loyalty and 
solidarity (Article 11) The EU has also decided to form a ci îsis management force based on the 
expectation that each country will offer contributions from its own defense force This is not the behavior 
of untrusting and aggressively intentioned states Offensive Neo realism fails as a useful theoretical tool to 
understand the security cooperation between the EU states
Nor does offensive Neo realism provide insight into the impact of the EU s institutions upon its members 
Not only do offensive Neo realists believe that institutions cannot shape state preferences they also argue 
that institutions have very little impact at all Institutions in this view can do virtually nothing to modify 
the competitive instincts of states Having analyzed the institutions of the EU I do not find this a helpful 
perspective Although I have not found evidence of the institutions taking on a life of their own (the EU 
institutions are certainly outcomes of the members interests and preferences and they remain 
intergovernmental) they have generated extensive cooperation by providing a forum for common decision 
making Without these institutions the EU states would not have achieved any cooperation and 
consequently competition would be rife in Europe These institutions have allowed the Western European 
states to be more transparent and trusting of one another For these reasons institutions have played a 
crucial role In sum offensive Neo realism fails to account for the role of the EU institutions
Defensive Neo realism What Explanation Does It Offer0
Unlike offensive Neo realism defensive Neo realism can explain EU security cooperation Defensive Neo 
realists view security as the underlying aim of states but they do not believe that states maximize power to 
achieve security nor do states necessarily have aggressive intentions Anarchy does produce a self help 
system and inherent competition but this does not necessanly produce aggression States are often able to 
achieve their security interests by cooperating with other states Defensive Neo realists also concede that 
institutions can play an important role in facilitating that cooperation As discussed in Chapter 3 there is 
some divergence within defensive Neo realism about the independent causal role of institutions but there is 
broad agreement that institutions provide an important forum for cooperation
Defensive Neo realism provides a good explanation for both cooperation between the EU states and EU 
institutions role in assisting in that cooperation The EU states have chosen to cooperate in order to 
produce mutual security Relative gains considerations have not restricted that involvement This is 
because as Schweller explains even though France for example may be relatively worse off by 
cooperating with all of the EU states because they will become more powerful it is better off vis a vis all 
outsiders to the EU Drawing upon Schweller s terminology which I outlined in Chapter 3 France in this 
case is A all the other EU states are B and outsiders are C According to offensive Neo realist logic
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France would choose not to cooperate in the EU because doing so would give each of the other EU 
members a relative advantage However in practice this is not the logic that has governed the decisions of 
the EU members Defensive Neo realism provides a far more insightful explanation It suggests that all 
states seek to maximize security not power The EU states have chosen cooperation as the best means to 
maximize security Because states do not necessarily have aggressive intentions they are willing to 
cooperate to achieve security So long as their intentions are transparent their gams from cheating are low 
their mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection and they adopt strategies of reciprocity they can 
cooperate to achieve mutual security
The EU institutions have served to meet the conditions necessary for cooperation The EU members have 
an array of fora such as GAC proceedings and the intergovernmental conferences for interaction and 
discussion They have also set up a telex network to allow enciphered messages to be transmitted between 
capitals Communication between the states occurs at many levels from the working parties to the Council 
Although these institutions may not be independent (they are operating in the way that the states founding 
them intended them to and have not taken on a life of their own) they are nevertheless extremely 
important The cooperation the EU states have achieved relies upon their existence
Defensive Neo realism explains EU cooperation and the role of the EU institutions by drawing upon the 
Neo realist core assumption of anarchy It ovei comes the competition bias present in offensive Neo 
realism by explaining how anarchy can in fact produce cooperation The offensive Neo realist focus upon 
power maximizing and aggression cannot explain EU security cooperation Its rigidity fails to encompass 
an entity like the EU For this reason the literature dismissing Neo realism based purely upon 
Mearsheimer s work is highly unsatisfactory In this thesis I have sought to overcome this 
misunderstanding and consequent rejection of Neo realism by drawing upon a defensive Neo realist 
understanding of cooperation
In some ways defensive Neo realism resembles libei il institutionalism Liberal institutionalists concede 
that the anarchy pervading the international system afiects the behavior of states and they also regard states 
as the most important actors They are optimistic about the prospects for state cooperation and they 
consider that institutions have a key role to play in enabling such cooperation However the differences 
between the two perspectives outweigh their similarities Liberal institutionalists criticize Neo realists both 
defensive and offensive for placing too much emphasis upon states to the exclusion of other actors Unlike 
Neo realists liberal institutionalists believe that non state actors can actually change states preferences 
They believe that institutions have pronounced causal significance (Although Jervis a defensive Neo 
realist has also expressed this view it is not one broadly shared within defensive Neo realism) Liberal 
institutionalists argue that institutions can mitigate the competitive effects of anarchy because they help 
produce cooperation Defensive Neo realists on the other hand believe that anarchy zteeZ/produces 
cooperation
II How well does Neo realism explain the potential emergence of a non state great power7
Considering that Neo realism (in its defensive variant) has been a useful theoretical tool for understanding 
EU security cooperation we might expect that it could explain the emergence of a non state great power 
But this is not a logical conclusion Neo íealism explains EU security cooperation by focusing on state 
interests and state behavior In order to explain the emergence of a non state great power Neo realists 
needs to relax their insistence that states are the main actors in the international system Neo realism needs 
to be flexible enough to accommodate an actoi like the EU which does not possess state like qualities 
such as a central government Although the EU is unlikely to become a great power in the next few years it 
will probably become one within a decade Potentially it may prove to be the first example of a new type 
of entity comprising sovereign states grouped geographically Theories must be able to accommodate 
changing realities in order to remain useful If Neo realism cannot account for the emergence of non state 
great powers it may not survive as a uselul theory of international politics
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Realism in its traditional form perceives the world in state centric terms However it does concede that this 
is a consequence of history that could change and states ma> not always be the principal actors in 
international politics Evidence of this can be found in the writing of Hans Morgenthau
The contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history and is 
therefore bound to disappear in the course of history Nothing in the realist position militates against the 
assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units 
of a quite different character (Morgenthau 1967 9)
Neo realism builds directly and explicitly on the assumptions of classical Realism (Waltz 1979) If nothing 
in classical Realism militates against the assumption that nation states may be replaced by different 
actors there is logically nothing in Neo realism that does so either Simply because Neo realism conceives 
of states as the main actors in the international system today there is no reason that it has to indefinitely 
Neo realists can without compromising their essential understanding of world politics admit other actors 
to the first rank of significance To brand Neo realism an outdated theory because of its contemporary focus 
upon states as so many scholars do is unsatisfactory As illustrated in this thesis Neo realism is an 
extremely useful theoretical tool for understanding a sui generis non state entity like the EU Rather than 
dismiss Neo realism we need to make it progressive enough to accommodate new realities
In summary to make Neo realism progressive we must relax its insistence that states are the main actors in 
the international system States do not face the threat of being supplanted by other actors but they do face 
the possibility of being joined in the top rank of international politics In the trade realm the EU already 
possesses the importance of a state This could become the case in all areas The EU may prove to be the
larger unit of a quite different character that Morgenthau foresaw Neo realism is a useful framework that 
does not require reconstruction It simply needs to be able to modify its focus to encompass new sorts of 
actors alongside states By doing this Neo realism will be able to thrive m parallel with historical changes 
and remain a useful theoretical framework
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis has been to address the question Is the EU becoming a great power? This question 
embodies both empirical and theoretical ambitions In order to ascertain whether the EU is becoming a 
great power I have used Waltz s five criteria of great power population and territory resource 
endowment economic capability political stability and competence and military strength The EU already 
fulfills four out of these five Where it currently falls short is the last criterion military strength The 
military capability required of a great power varies according to three factors its performance in the other 
entena, whether it has nuclear weapons and its foreign policy interests Because the EU is such a powerful 
economic actor is covered by nuclear deterrence and has fairly modest security interests it does not 
require a large conventional force It only needs a military large enough to act as a trip wire so that it can 
reveal the aggressive intentions of a potential attacker and to protect its interests At this point in time the 
EU does not have such a force However it has plans to develop a crisis management force of 
50 000-60 000 troops to be ready by 2003 The crisis management force would be large enough to act as a 
trip wire and it would also support EU diplomacy and protect EU interests in wider Europe All the EU 
members have been supportive of this force and so its chances of coming to fruition are good particularly 
considering the success of the November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference
In the case of a non state actor like the EU I have argued that a sixth criterion needs to be added to 
Waltz s list a unified foreign policy Waltz supports this addition The EU has a CFSP but this does not 
presently fulfill the conditions of a unified foreign policy The problem lies not so much with the 
formulation of a single policy position (although this could be improved by extending the exceptions to the 
general principle of unanimity voting) but with the lack of a single authoritative voice The European 
Council the Council the Presidency the High Representative the Member States and various other agents 
all play a role in the CFSP s representation Although the Presidency formally has the task of representing
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the CFSP externally its six month term and its lack of authority make this infeasible To overcome this 
impediment, the Presidency should be reformed so that it consists of a number of countries working 
together with tenure of several years It is difficult to determine whether these changes will take place 
Although they have not been planned they are not demanding and the EU states have illustrated previous 
willingness to carry out such reform It is unlikely that enlargement would interfere too much with this 
process In fact it may even serve as a catalyst for CFSP reform
The empirical ambition of this thesis has been to determine whether the EU is becoming a great power My 
conclusion is that the EU is unlikely to emerge as a great power within the next few years It must first 
create its proposed crisis management force and it must also reform the CFSP However these are not 
demanding changes and considering the political will expressed by the EU members we will probably see 
the EU emerge as a great power within the next decade
The question of the EU s emergence as a great power prompts important theoretical considerations There 
is a void in the literature on EU security and defense cooperation The little theoretical literature which 
does exist completely neglects Neo realist theory even though Neo realism is the dominant paradigm in 
security studies Neo realism has been iejected because it is considered too state centric too rigid and 
unsuitable for understanding institutions However these criticisms apply only to offensive Neo realism 
As my analysis shows offensive Neo realism does not offer a useful explanation for EU security 
cooperation But Neo realism in its entirety should not be dismissed Neo realism in its defensive variant 
can explain EU security cooperation Drawing upon the logic of anarchy which forces states to protect 
their own survival defensive Neo realists deduce that cooperation will often be the best means available to 
states in the pursuit of security They argue that institutions help create the conditions necessary for 
cooperation by providing a forum for discussion and helping ensure transparency and adherence to rules In 
this task defensive Neo realists generally agree institutions merely reflect the wishes of states-they are not 
independent
Although defensive Neo realism is able to explain EU security cooperation it may be unable to account for 
the future rise of non state great poweis like the EU because of its state centric focus However Neo 
realism should not be discarded as an outdated theory if this situation were to arise Neo realist scholars 
must relax their insistence upon the primacy of states In order to remain relevant Neo realism must be 
able to encompass the importance of new non state actors which may arrive upon the international scene 
Traditional Realism has illustrated a willingness to do so and Neo realism can learn from this By 
accommodating historical changes Neo íealism will continue to be a useful theoretical tool
In this thesis I have fulfilled three significant tasks Fust I have addressed the question of whether the EU 
is becoming a great power The number ot great powers in the international system dictates polarity which 
in turn impacts upon the behavior of states Although the EU is unlikely to be a great power in the 
immediate future it is an entity that International Relations scholars need to examine carefully Second I 
have addressed the flaw in the literature on LU security cooperation which has dismissed Neo realism as 
an unsuitable theoretical tool Neo realism in its defensive variant can in fact explain EU security 
cooperation very well Until now defensive Neo realism has been overlooked in this research area Third I 
have attempted to make Neo realism progressive by encouraging Neo realist scholars to accept the 
potential rise to great power status of a non state ictoi Neo realism has traditionally viewed states as the 
most important actors in international politics It should be willing to broaden this view to encompass 
actors like the EU Classical Realists like Moigenthau argued that the state s primacy in global politics 
might be temporary The time may soon airive foi stiles to share the top rank with non state actors
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Title V of the Revised Treaty on the European Union
PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Article 11
1 The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of 
foreign and security policy the objectives of which shall be
to safeguard the common values fundamental interests independence and integrity of the Union in 
conformity with the principles of the United Nations Chartei
to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways
to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter 
including those on external borders
to promote international cooperation
to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms
2 The Member States shall support the Union s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity They shall 
refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness 
as a cohesive force in international relations
The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with
Article 12
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 bv
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy 
deciding on common strategies 
adopting joint actions 
adopting common positions and
strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy 
Article 13
1 The European Council shall define the principles ol and general guidelines for the common foreign and 
security policy including for matters with defense implications
2 The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas 
where the Member States have important interests in common
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Common strategies shall set out their objectives duration and the means to be made available by the Union 
and the Member States
3 The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and 
security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them in 
particular by adopting joint actions and common positions
The Council shall ensure the unity consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union
Article 14
1 The Council shall adopt joint actions Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational 
action by the Union is deemed to be requited They shall lay down their objectives scope the means to be 
made available to the Union it necessaiy their duration and the conditions for their implementation
2 If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action the 
Council shall review the principles and ob|cctives of that action and take the necessary decisions As long 
as the Council has not acted the joint action shall stand
3 Joint actions shall commit the Member Slates in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their 
activity
4 The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the 
common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action
5 Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action 
information shall be provided in time to allow if necessary for prior consultations within the Council The 
obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national 
transposition of Council decisions
6 In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision Member 
States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of 
the joint action The Membei State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures
7 Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action a Member State shall refer them to 
the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions Such solutions shall not run counter 
to the objectives of the joint action or impali its effectiveness
Article 15
The Council shall adopt common positions Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a 
particular matter of a geographical or them me nature Member States shall ensure that their national 
policies conform to the common positions
Article 16
Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and 
security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union s influence is exerted as effectively as 
possible by means of concerted and convergent action
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Article 17
1 The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union 
including the progressive framing of a common defense policy in accordance with the second 
subparagraph which might lead to a common defense should the European Council so decide It shall in 
that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements
The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral pm t oí the development of the Union providing the 
Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2 It supports the Union 
in framing the defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article The 
Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of 
the integration of the WEU into the Union should the Curopean Council so decide It shall in that case 
recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements
The policy of the Union m accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member 
States which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under 
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established 
within that framework The progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported as Member 
States consider appropriate by cooperation between them in the field of armaments
2 Questions referred to in this Article shall include humamtaiian and rescue tasks peacekeeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking
3 The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defense implications
The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also 
obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU
When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks 
referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in 
question The Council in agreement with the institutions of the WEU shall adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an 
equal footing in planning and decision taking in the WEU
Decisions having defense implications dealt with undci this paragnph shall be taken without prejudice to 
the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1 third subparagraph
4 The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or 
more Member States on a bilateral level in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance provided 
such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title
5 With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in 
accordance with Article 48
Article 18
1 The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security 
policy
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2 The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this Title in that 
capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and 
international conferences
3 The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function 
of High Representative for the common foieign and security policy
4 The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 The Presidency 
shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency
5 The Council may whenever it deems it necessary appoint a special representative with a mandate in 
relation to particular policy issues
Article 19
1 Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international 
conferences They shall uphold the common positions in such fora
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate 
those which do take part shall uphold the common positions
2 Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3) Member States represented in international 
organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter 
informed of any matter of common interest
Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the 
other Member States fully informed Member States which are permanent members of the Security 
Council will in the execution of their functions ensure the defense of the positions and the interests of the 
Union without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter
Article 20
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third 
countries and international conferences and then representations to international organizations shall 
cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied 
with and implemented
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging infoimation carrying out joint assessments and contributing 
to the implementation of the piovisions lelerred to in Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community
Article 21
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the 
common foreign and security policy and slnll ensuie that the views of the European Parliament are duly 
taken into consideration The Euiopean Pu liament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and 
the Commission of the development of the Union s foreign and security policy
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it It shall hold an 
annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy
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Article 22
1 Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common 
foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council
2 In cases requiring a rapid decision the Presidency of its o\\ n motion or at the request of the 
Commission or a Member State shall convene an extnordimi} Council meeting within forty eight hours 
or in an emergency within a shorter period
Article 23
1 Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously Abstentions by members 
present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions
When abstaining in a vote any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal 
declaration under the present subparagraph In that case it shall not be obliged to apply the decision but 
shall accept that the decision commits the Union In a spirit of mutual solidarity the Member State 
concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with oi impede Union action based on that 
decision and the other Member States shall respect its position If the members of the Council qualifying 
their abstention in this way represent more than one thud of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 
205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community the decision shall not be adopted
2 By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1 the Council shall act by qualified majority
when adopting joint actions common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common 
strategy
when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position
If a member of the Council declares that for important and stated reasons of national policy it intends to 
oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority a vote shall not be taken The Council 
may acting by a qualified majority request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision 
by unanimity
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community For their adoption decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favor 
cast by at least 10 members
This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defense implications
3 For procedural questions the Council shall act by a majority of its members
Article 24
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organizations in 
implementation of this Title the Council acting unanimously may authorize the Presidency assisted by 
the Commission as appropriate to open negotiations to that effect Such agreements shall be concluded by 
the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Piesidency No agreement shall be binding 
on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of 
its own constitutional procedure the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall 
apply provisionally to them
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The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI
Article 25
Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community a Political Committee 
shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and 
contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or 
on its own initiative It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission
Article 26
The Secretary-General ot the Council High Representative for the common foreign and security policy 
shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy in 
particular through contributing to the formulation preparation and implementation of policy decisions and 
when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency through conducting 
political dialogue with third parties
Article 27
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security 
policy field
Article 28
1 Articles 189 190 196 to 199 203 204 206 to 209 213 to 219 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title
2 Administrative expenditure which the provisions entail for the institutions in the areas referred to in this 
Title shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities
3 Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged 
to the budget of the European Communities except for such expenditure arising from operations having 
military or defense implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise
In cases where expendituie is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to 
the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale unless the Council acting 
unanimously decides otherwise As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defense 
implications Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under 
Article 23(1) second subparagraph shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof
4 The budgetary procedure laid down in the Tieaty establishing the European Community shall apply to 
the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities
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ABBREVIATIONS
bbl billion barrels
CF SP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
EC European Community
EDC European Defense Cooperation
EPC European Political Cooperation
EU European Union
GAC General Affairs Council
GNP Gross National Product
HR High Representative
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IR International Relations
MC Military Committee
MS Military Staff
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Non Proliferation Treaty
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PoCo Political Committee
PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC Political and Security Committee
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
RRF Rapid Reaction Force
TEU Treaty on European Union
UN United Nations
WEU Western European Union
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